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FEDERAL INDIAN LAW-AMBIGUOUS ABROGATION: THE 
FIRST CIRCUIT STRIPS THE NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE OF ITs 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Sachem Matthew Thomas got up and put on a shirt and 
tie.1 The Narragansett tribe leader expected to end the day in fed­
eral court, where he would confront the Rhode Island officials who 
were attempting to shut down the tribe's tax-free smoke shop.2 But 
when Tribal Councilman Hiawatha Brown called at one in the after­
noon to say that a convoy of Rhode Island state troopers was 
headed to the shop, Thomas had a feeling that the confrontation 
might not wait until the tribe and the state made it to court.3 When 
the state troopers entered tribal lands under orders to shut down 
the smoke shop, the Narragansett tribespeople stood their ground.4 
The police showed a state warrant, which the federally acknowl­
edged tribe refused to recognize.5 Tribespeople who attempted to 
block the shop's entrance were thrown to the ground and hand­
cuffed by flak-jacketed state police. The police confiscated the 
smoke shop's inventory of untaxed tobacco along with the money 
the Narragansett tribe had earned from sales.6 In a scene reminis­
cent of the clashes of the civil rights era, the gathered people 
chanted "let our Chief go," as state officers dragged bloodied men 
out of the. shop.7 
1. Michael Corkery, Clash Over Smoke Shop-Raid Came After Talks Broke 
Down, PROVIDENCE J., July 16, 2003, at AI, available at 2003 WLNR 6912411. The 
Narragansett's traditional leaders, known as sachems, are drawn from high-ranking tri­
bal families. 
2. Id.; Paul Davis & Katie Mulvaney, State, Tribe Offer Differing Views on Sover­
eignty Status, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 21, 2003, at AI, available at 2003 WLNR 6794087. 
3. Corkery, supra note 1; Katie Mulvaney & Paul Davis, Clash Over Smoke 
Shop-R.l. Police, Narragansetts Clash, PROVIDENCE J., July 15,2003, at AI, available 
at 2003 WLNR 6712314. 
4. Mulvaney & Davis, supra note 3. 
5. Edward Fitzpatrick & Jennifer Levitz, Indians, State Say They Couldn't Give in 
on Smoke-Shop Issue, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 22,2003, at AI, available at 2003 WLNR 
6659824. 
6. Mulvaney & Davis, supra note 3. 
7. Id. 
243 
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The smoke shop raid, as it came to be known, involved more 
than the tribe's right to sell tax-free cigarettes.s The division of 
power between the State of Rhode Island and the Narragansett had 
been a subject of dispute since the tribe recovered a portion of its 
ancestral lands and completed its long journey to federal acknowl­
edgment.9 The state contended that it had always possessed the 
right to enter tribal lands and enforce state laws against all parties, 
including the tribe itself.lO The tribe insisted that as a sovereign 
American Indian nation it was answerable only to the federal gov­
ernment and was immune from state law.!1 Chief Sachem Thomas 
and his people consistently voiced their determination to recover 
the self-governing and self-sufficient status they had enjoyed before 
they lost their land to European colonization, even though the State 
of Rhode Island believed them incapable of controlling their own 
destiny.!2 To the Narragansett, Rhode Island's policies were irrele­
vant; the tribe was independent of state law and answerable only to 
Congress, which had never authorized state taxation of, nor legal 
control over, the Narragansett tribe.B 
For the Narragansett, opening a smoke shop on their lands 
gave voice to years of frustration with the state's continual obstruc­
tion of tribal attempts to build a casino.!4 Tax-free tobacco was the 
next-best .way to produce the revenue the tribe needed to care for 
its impoverished people. IS For Governor Donald Carcieri and the 
State of Rhode Island, the opening of the shop was an affront to the 
state's civil and criminal laws, and an attempt to gain a new foot­
hold in the ongoing battle over who had the real governmental 
power on Narragansett lands.16 While the state government in­
sisted that no one should be harmed over the illegal sale of ciga­
8. Corkery, supra note 1. 
9. See infra notes 143-165 and accompanying text. 
10. Davis & Mulvaney, supra note 2. 
11. Id. 
12. Fitzpatrick & Levitz, supra note 5. 
13. Davis & Mulvaney, supra note 2. 
14. See generally Bryan 1. Nowlin, Conflicts in Sovereignty: The Narragansett 
Tribe in Rhode Island, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151 (2005) (discussing the history of the 
tribe's attempts to build a casino, as well as the legislative response to the tribe's early 
legal victories in that arena). 
15. Corkery, supra note 1. 
16. Fitzpatrick & Levitz, supra note 5. Although the state claimed that it wanted 
to help the Narragansett economically and was willing to talk about development strat­
egies, neither the governor nor the legislature was willing to support a bill that would 
allow a statewide casino referendum. Id.; see also The Narragansetts, in Context, PROVI­
DENCE J., July 20, 2003, at A12, available at 2003 WLNR 6729894. 
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rettes, it claimed that Rhode Island, not the federal courts, had the 
authority to deal with the Narragansett smoke shopY From the 
state's point of view, allowing the untaxed sale of tobacco would be 
an admission of Narragansett sovereignty, which the state stead­
fastly refused to acknowledge.1s 
The smoke shop conflict between the Narragansett Tribe and 
the State of Rhode Island is emblematic of the troubled relation­
ships between eastern American Indian tribes and states that have 
existed since the American Revolution.19 This Note will explore 
the legal saga of the smoke shop raid and conclude that its judicial 
resolution is inconsistent with the guiding principles of Federal In­
dian law. Part I begins by sketching the history of relations be­
tween native peoples and the federal government, with an emphasis 
on two over arching themes that emerge from this history: judicial 
respect for American Indians' separate cultural and political iden­
tity, and the federal government's jealous and exclusive control 
over Indian affairs. It continues by discussing the evolution and sig­
nificance of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Finally, it 
examines the reluctance of federal courts to find that Congress has 
abrogated that immunity. 
Part II examines the canons of construction developed by the 
Supreme Court to ensure that judicial interpretations of Federal In­
dian laws comport with the longstanding obligation of the United 
States to protect Indian interests. Part III provides a summary of 
the historical and jurisprudential relationship between the Narra­
gansett, the State of Rhode Island, and the federal government. 
This Part goes on to discuss the First Circuit Court of Appeals' en­
dorsement of Rhode Island's jurisdiction over the Narragansett 
tribe and demonstrates how the decision strays from the guiding 
principles enumerated in congressional enactments and Supreme 
Court precedent. Finally, Part IV begins by discussing the First Cir­
cuit's misinterpretation of the Narragansett's land claim and places 
the claim in the appropriate historical, legal, and political context. 
Part IV continues by showing that the court's decision rests on 
flawed assertions regarding basic principles of Federal Indian law. 
17. Fitzpatrick & Levitz, supra note 5. 
18. Id. 
19. Prior to the Revolution, this troubled relationship existed between tribes and 
the British North American colonies. See generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant 
Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1064-98 (1995) (discussing the frac­
tious history of relations between the tribes and the colonies and the impetus it pro­
vided toward consolidating power in the federal government over Indian affairs). 
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In conclusion, this Note applies the interpretive principles particu­
lar to Indian law to the tribe-state conflict and shows how a holding 
that followed precedent would have also respected the rights and 
privileges of both state and tribal governments. 
I. HISTORY AND IMMUNITY 
A. Relations Between American Indians and the United States 
The long history between American Indian tribes and the 
United States has created a binary legal relationship between Con­
gress and the tribes that nearly completely excludes the states. This 
section begins with a survey of that relationship, starting with the 
early recognition of American Indian tribes as political sovereigns, 
and travels though current conceptions of far-reaching federal 
power and the declared national policy of Indian self-determina­
tion. A unifying theme that emerges from this survey is the near­
constant effort of the federal government to exclude the states from 
any role in Indian affairs. 
1. The Treaty Period 
The Europeans who colonized North America recognized 
American Indian tribes as sovereign nations capable of indepen­
dently conducting their political affairs and entering into treaties 
and alliances.20 This acknowledgment of tribes as distinct nations 
contradicted the prevailing European hostility toward non-Euro­
pean peoples, but it conformed to the practical necessity of ensur­
ing the survival of small, isolated colonies that were surrounded and 
outnumbered by powerful native groups.21 Agreements between 
European and native sovereigns were bi- or multilateral in nature, 
involved negotiations and concessions by all parties, and generally 
reflected a reality of accommodation rather than a relationship of 
conquest.22 
British recognition of American Indian sovereignty was quali­
fied, however, by the doctrine of discovery.23 This doctrine recog­
nized in native people exclusive rights of occupancy but gave the 
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832). 
21. Howard R. Berman, Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and Inter­
national Law, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, 
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 125, 128 (Oren R. Lyons & John C. Mohawk eds., 1992). 
22. Id. at 129. 
23. Clinton, supra note 19, at 1064-65. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all 
justified their New World acquisitions by reference to the discovery doctrine as well. 
See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-76 (1823). 
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discovering European sovereign the exclusive right to acquire fee 
title from them.24 Discovery made plain the fact that American In­
dians were less than full owners of their land, as they could not 
transfer absolute title to anyone but the British Crown. It also re­
stricted third parties, who could acquire legitimate title to native 
peoples' land only through the King.25 Although its moral and le­
gal foundations were uncertain,26 the doctrine of discovery played 
an essential role in the colonial development of the New World, and 
enabled the British to suppress the conflicts that would otherwise 
have resulted from decentralized control over Indian affairs.27 
24. According to the doctrine of discovery, the United States 
maintain[ed], as all others have maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive 
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by con­
quest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty [in the Indians], as 
the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise. 
The power now possessed by the government of the United States to 
grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the crown, or its grantees. The 
validity of the titles given by either has never been questioned in our Courts. 
It has been exercised uniformly over territory in possession of the Indians. 
The existence of this power must negative the existence of any right which 
may conflict with, and control it. An absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the 
same time, in different persons, or in different governments. An absolute, 
must be an exclusive title, or at least a title which excludes all others not com­
patible with it. All our institutions recognise the absolute title of the crown, 
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and recognise the absolute title 
of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an absolute 
and complete title in the Indians. 
Johnson, 21 U.S at 587-88. 
25. Id. at 59l. 
26. Chief Justice Marshall conceded that the doctrine's treatment of Indian land 
rights was "opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations," but never­
theless asserted that it had been "indispensable to [the] system under which the country 
has been settled" and should thus be recognized and perpetuated by the courts. Id. 
Discovery provided an economically efficient legal framework with which to justify a 
policy of taking lands that all parties recognized as belonging to Indian tribes. See Eric 
Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of 
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1136-39 (2000). 
Discovery provides the underpinnings of Federal Indian policy and of the Supreme 
Court's Indian jurisprudence. For a searching examination of the doctrine's role in fa­
cilitating European conquest of the Americas, as well as its continuing influence in 
American law, see Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian 
Law, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 1 (2005). Numerous scholars have suggested that real justice 
for American Indians is unobtainable as long as the doctrine of discovery continues to 
influence Federal Indian law. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal 
Indian Law: The Hard Trail ofDecolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian 
Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REv. 219. 
27. "[T]rade abuses and land encroachments [by British colonists] had caused 
substantial unrest among the Indians .... [and] afforded considerable evidence of the 
importance of centralized coordination of Indian trade, land and diplomatic policies." 
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After the Revolution, the United States found itself in the po­
sition previously occupied by the British Crown-in need of a uni­
fied Indian policy and anxious about the conflicts that would erupt 
if the states arrogated to themselves the power to seize Indian 
lands,28 The new nation adopted the British approach, affirming 
existing obligations and seeking to sign new treaties in which native 
people would cede land to the federal government in exchange for 
protection from state incursions,29 
The exclusive role of the federal government in Indian affairs 
is memorialized in the Indian Commerce Clause,3o This constitu­
tional grant is traditionally interpreted as limiting state power to 
conduct Indian affairs in the same way that the Interstate Com­
merce Clause blocks state regulation of interstate commerce,31 
Combined with the President's treaty power,32 the Indian Com­
merce Clause allowed the national government to fully federalize 
Indian policy with the Trade and Intercourse Acts, which invali­
dated all conveyances of land between Indians and non-Indians not 
made pursuant to a valid federal treaty,33 
With these grants of power in hand, Congress endeavored to 
protect American Indians from state and individual depredations 
and assume unquestioned control over the process by which native 
lands would be incorporated into the United States,34 Indian policy 
in the early nineteenth century followed a dichotomous path: the 
federal government negotiated treaties with tribes as nominal 
equals, and at the same time asserted a paternalistic and controlling 
Clinton, supra note 19, at 1097-98. For a detailed discussion of the conflicts produced 
by decentralized Indian policy in the colonial period, see id. at 1064-98. 
28. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20-25 (Nell Jessup Newton et 
al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]. 
29. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Lim­
itations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195,200 (1984). 
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
31. Clinton, supra note 19, at 1062. For a general discussion of the limitations on 
state action imposed by the negative implications of the grants of power contained in 
the Commerce Clause, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 419-28 (3d ed. 2006). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties" with foreign powers.). 
33. The first of these was the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 
137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.c. § 177 (2000». This Act is the law that the Narra­
gansett claimed the State of Rhode Island violated when it detribalized them and ac­
quired their remaining lands in 1880. See Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S. R.I. Land 
Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976). 
34. VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 40 (1983). 
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role that comported more honestly with the growing imbalance of 
power in the relationship.35 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Chief 
Justice Marshall penned the definitive statement of this contradic­
tory formula of American Indian sovereignty and federal power: 
[t]hough the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestiona­
ble, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, 
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our 
government .... They occupy a territory to which we assert a 
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of 
possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they 
are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.36 
As described in Cherokee Nation, American Indian tribes are 
separate political entities possessed of sovereignty.37 The federal 
government has a responsibility to protect the tribes from all who 
would harm them, especially the states.38 This recognition and pro­
tection, however, comes at a cost: the Indian right of occupancy 
exists subject to an independently asserted title in the United 
States, the only political entity to which tribes may legitimately 
alienate their lands.39 This formulation reflected a vision of native 
tribes as "domestic dependent nations"40 whose relations with the 
federal government, once conducted along the model of foreign af­
fairs, were now subject to unilateral adjustment by the United 
States.41 
2. Plenary Power 
In 1871, the vision of Federal Indian policy suggested in Chero­
kee Nation became law when Congress declared that it would no 
longer ratify treaties with Indian tribes.42 Since Indians were not 
35. Id. at 41; Newton, supra note 29, at 201-02. 
36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
37. Newton, supra note 29, at 204-05; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 
16. 
38. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that 
Georgia's attempted assertion of jurisdiction over Indian treaty lands violates the 
United States' commitment to protect Indian tribes from trespass by the peoples of the 
states, and castigating the state for interfering in Indian affairs, "the regulation of 
which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively 
to the government of the union"). 
39. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
40. Id. 
41. Newton, supra note 29, at 205. 
42. Treaties Statute of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.c. § 71 (2000)). 
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citizens of the United States,43 the choice to conduct Indian affairs 
via legislation meant that native people would be governed as sub­
jects, without active input into the policies that shape their lives.44 
This assertion of plenary power ushered in an era in which Con­
gress repeatedly intervened in tribes' internal affairs-attempting 
to "civilize" native people by teaching them concepts of free enter­
prise and converting them to Christianity-and transferred vast 
amounts of Indian land to whites.45 Notwithstanding the fact that 
congressional action was usually couched in the desire to improve 
the Indians' unhappy lot, these policies aimed at breaking down tri­
bal culture and forcibly assimilating native people were almost uni­
formly disastrous.46 
The Marshall Court recognized an American Indian right of 
occupancy and self-government.47 Nevertheless, the Court insisted 
43. Although some individuals gained citizenship earlier, the entire American In­
dian population did not become citizens of the United States until the Citizenship Act 
of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.c. § 1401 (2000». 
44. Newton, supra note 29, at 206. 
45. Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 
1870-1992, in EXILED IN lliE LAND. OF lliE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS, AND 
lliE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 318-22. Between 1887 and 1934, Indian 
landholdings declined from approximately 138 million acres to 52 million acres. Id. at 
322. 
Many scholars believe the concept of plenary power over the Indians is fundamen­
tally inconsistent with the constitutional vision of a federal government with limited, 
enumerated powers. See DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN 
GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 114-16 (2001); Sarah 
H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nine­
teenth Century Origins ofPlenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,25-42 
(2002) (discussing the contradictions inherent in the use of extra-constitutional legal 
concepts to legitimize the supposedly absolute power over Indians possessed by a gov­
ernment of otherwise limited, enumerated powers). See generally Natsu Taylor Saito, 
The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights in the Name of Sovereignty, 51 
CAlli. U. L. REV. 1115 (2002) (calling on the United States to reject plenary power and 
accept that the doctrine is inconsistent with the nation's commitment to human rights). 
For a look at the central role of Christian conversion in the "civilizing" mission to 
which American Indians were subjected, see Steven T. Newcomb, The Evidence of 
Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v. 
McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303 (1993). 
46. From 1871 to 1961, federal Indian policy lurched from allotment (intended to 
turn Indians into Jeffersonian yeoman farmers) to reorganization (intended to revive 
tribal identity and encourage self-government) to termination (intended to eliminate 
tribal identity and law). FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 75-97. While the 
announced aims of each of these programs were to help the Indians better cope with 
life in the United States, their consequence was a nearly uniform deepening of poverty 
and isolation. Id. at 97. 
47. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); Johnson v. 
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823) (recognizing the right of occupancy). 
251 2009] AMBIGUOUS ABROGATION 
that since the Revolution Congress had possessed the power to uni­
laterally adjust tribes' external relations and internal affairs.48 This 
extraordinary claim of right was qualified only by the trust doctrine, 
a good faith requirement in Federal Indian policy that arises from 
the tortuous course of dealing between native peoples and the fed­
eral government.49 The trust doctrine is rooted in the recognition 
that the United States bears primary responsibility for tribes' 
"weakness and helplessness," and consequently has an obligation to 
protect them from parties who would profit at their expense-in­
cluding, most prominently, the states.50 The Supreme Court has 
held that, under the trust doctrine, the federal government's deal­
ings with American Indians must "be judged by the most exacting 
fiduciary standards. "51 
48. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). This assertion of longtime 
power to regulate the internal affairs of Indian tribes came at the conclusion of nearly a 
century of constant warfare between the United States and numerous native peoples. 
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reserva­
tions with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 
1995 UTAH L. REv. 1105, 1131. 
49. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 418-22. 
50. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). The trust doctrine is the 
subject of ongoing debate. Some thinkers believe that it imposes strict limitations on 
permissible congressional action, while others deny the existence of any legally cogniza­
ble federal duty toward American Indians. See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 45, 
at 64-97. The doctrine has also been attacked as a culturally biased construction whose 
thinly veiled purpose is to legitimize federal control over native peoples. See Note, 
Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422, 426-27 
(1984). While individual treaties and statutes often ground federal Indian policy in the 
trust doctrine, courts have divided over whether the trust responsibility creates legally 
enforceable federal duties in the absence of textually enumerated obligations. See gen­
erally Reid Payton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility 
to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975). Some advocates for tribal sovereignty believe 
that the paternalistic relationship between the United States and Indian tribes that 
forms the basis of the trust doctrine is fundamentally incompatible with tribal self-de­
termination. See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the Trust 
Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291 (2005). 
But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitu­
tion, 39 TULSA L. REV. 247, 253-56 (2003) (arguing that the ultimate legacy of the appli­
cation of rational basis review to federal laws affecting Indians is to constitutionalize 
the trust obligation). 
51. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942). Notwithstanding 
the high standard enunciated in Seminole Nation, the Court will not overturn a congres­
sional enactment affecting Indian rights so long as it "can be tied rationally to the fulfill­
ment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535,555 (1974). For a general discussion of the relatively relaxed scrutiny implicated by 
the standard of review announced in Mancari, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 677­
89 (describing the application of rational basis review in the equal protection context). 
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3. Self-Determination 
By the late 1960s, the failures of the last hundred years had 
combined with a rising tide of American Indian political activism to 
force another change of direction in Federal Indian policy.52 Presi­
dent Richard Nixon inaugurated this shift in a speech urging Con­
gress to discard the policies of termination and assimilation in favor 
of legislation that would support tribal autonomy and self-govern­
ment.53 In Nixon's view, Indians languished in poverty and desper­
ation because centuries of abuse and neglect at the hands of whites 
had deprived them of both land and independent identity.54 He 
grounded his call for a policy shift in the federal trust obligation, 
which, he said, "continues to carry immense moral and legal 
force."55 Congress responded with legislation meant to encourage 
and protect tribal governments and economies. The Indian Self­
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDA) was 
exemplary of the new congressional approach.56 The ISDA ac­
knowledged "the obligation of the United States to respond to the 
strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination" and 
affirmed Congress's "commitment to the maintenance of the Fed­
eral Government's unique and continuing relationship with and re­
sponsibility to the Indian people."57 
One important outgrowth of both the upsurge in Indian politi­
cal activism and the congressional shift in favor of self-determina­
tion was the assertion of land claims by numerous eastern tribes.58 
These claims, premised on the Indian right of occupancy identified 
in Johnson v. M'Intosh, alleged that Indian lands had been improp­
erly alienated to states or individuals in violation of one of the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts.59 In Oneida Indian Nation v. County 
52. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 98; Hauptman, supra note 45, at 334­
35. 
53. President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs (July 8,1970), 
in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 
2000). 
54. Id. at 256-57. 
55. Id. at 257. 
56. See 25 U.S.c. § 450 (2000). 
57. Id. § 450a. 
58. See, e.g., Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 483 F. Supp. 597 (D. Conn. 1980); 
Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1977); Schaghticoke 
Tribe of Indians v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976); Narragansett 
Tribe of Indians v. S. R.l. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.l. 1976); Joint Tribal 
Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me. 1975). 
59. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823); see also supra notes 
23-27 and accompanying text. For an example of a Trade and Intercourse Act, see the 
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of Oneida, the Supreme Court held that tribes who alleged that 
their land had been alienated in violation of federal law had a valid 
federal cause of action, specifically alluding to Congress's intent to 
insulate Indian land claims from state law.60 County of Oneida and 
its progeny reminded the United States that the trust relationship 
and plenary power create a federal responsibility to defend tribes 
against states' thirst for Indian land, even though that responsibility 
had been long neglected in some quarters.61 
Self-determination remains Federal Indian policy, and congres­
sional enactments continue to give tribes the advantages and recog­
nition accorded to other governments.62 Some tribes have seen 
rapid economic gains as a result of gambling enterprises built under 
the auspices of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)-fed­
eral legislation that calls for government-to-government relation­
ships between states and tribes.63 Notably, the IGRA contains a 
provision requiring states to negotiate gaming compacts with Indian 
tribes in good faith,64 and reserves the right of the federal govern­
ment to impose gaming regulations directly should a state be un-
Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (codified as amended at 25 
u.s.c. § 177). 
60. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675-76 (1974). In 
County of Oneida, the Court relied on the exclusive nature of the federal-tribal rela­
tionship for its finding that Indians asserting land claims against states "asserted a con­
troversy arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. at 
667. As a consequence, the Court held, the federal courts had original and exclusive 
jurisdiction over Indian land claims. Id. 
61. This aspect of the Court's Indian jurisprudence has remained remarkably con­
sistent. See id. at 677 ("[F]ederal law now protects, and has continuously protected 
from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory right to tribal lands, 
wholly apart from the application of state law principles."); see also United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (American Indians "owe no allegiance to the States, 
and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the 
States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies."); Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (The "laws of the United States contemplate the Indian 
territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all inter­
course with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union."); 
Ann C. Juliano, What is the Federal Government's Trust Responsibility Towards Re-· 
moved and Unremoved Indian Nations?, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 71, 73 (2004) 
(arguing that the trust responsibility obligates the federal government to protect tribal 
self-government and property rights and to "vigorously defend tribes against the exer­
cise of state authority"). 
62. See BRYAN H. WILDENTHAL, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY ON TRIAL, 
125-26 (2003) (discussing the government-to-government relations built into legislation 
such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.c. §§ 2701-21 (2000), and recent 
amendments to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.c. 
§ 450 (2000». 
63. Id. at 109; see also 25 U.S.c. §§ 2701-21. 
64. 25 U.S.c. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
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willing to fulfill its obligations.65 Such provisions are a reminder of 
Congress's exclusive power over Indian affairs,66 and the fact that 
tribes "owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no 
protection."67 
B. 	 Tribal Sovereign Immunity: What It Is and How It Protects 
Tribal Interests 
The framers of the Constitution believed that immunity from 
legal process was an inherent aspect of the power to govern, incapa­
ble of compromise or elimination without the sovereign's consent.68 
Although not mentioned in the Constitution, the sovereign immu­
nity of the states was recognized in the negotiations and com­
promises that led to ratification, and is thus fairly said to have a 
Constitutional basis.69 American Indian tribes, by contrast, were 
not party to the Constitutional Convention, and did not benefit 
from the reciprocal concessions in which states gave up some of 
their immunity to join the federal union.70 The absence of tribal 
governments from the Constitutional Convention suggests that 
their sovereign immunity exists today in its original and unmodified 
form, unlike that of the states.71 
65. Id. § 2710(7)(B)(vii). 
66. Id. § 2710. 
67. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
68. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Im­
munity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Funda­
mental Aspect ofAmerican Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 661 (2002) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton». 
69. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) ("[A]s the Constitution's structure, 
its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States' 
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed 
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today ...."). After 
ratification, the states retained their sovereignty and sovereign immunity to the extent 
consistent with their entry into the federal system. Id. at 713-14 (citing U.S. CaNsT. 
amend. X). Some commentators dispute the Court's assertion that the framers in­
tended to recognize the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2001). 
70. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991). The Court 
has held that, by ratifying the Constitution, states submitted to suits by other states as 
well as by the United States. Id. (citing South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 
318 (1904); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642 (1892». 
71. Id. at 782 ("We have repeatedly held that Indian tribes enjoy immunity 
against suits by States, as it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immu­
nity in a convention to which they were not even parties." (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted»; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) 
("It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent 
and sovereign nations, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own 
Government."); Seielstad, supra note 68, at 771-72 (arguing that tribal immunity should 
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1. The Tribal Immunity Doctrine 
Despite the fact that the sovereignty of American Indian tribes 
predates the founding of the United States,n tribal sovereign im­
munity emerged as a coherent judicial doctrine only in the mid­
twentieth century.73 As Indian tribes began their slow recovery 
under federal self-determination policy, the Supreme Court de­
scribed the boundaries and functions of the doctrine, while repeat­
edly deferring to Congress on the question of its vitality.74 
Under the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, federally ac­
knowledged Indian tribes are immune from suit by all parties ex­
cept the United States.75 Tribal immunity restricts remedy, not 
substantive liability, which means that tribes are not susceptible to 
legal process even when their activities are subject to regulation 
under state or federallaw.76 Accordingly, a party to whom a tribe 
owes an obligation may go without a remedy. However, while a 
receive more federal protection than state immunity because tribal governments pre­
date the Constitution and took no part in its writing or ratification). Of course, a tribe's 
theoretically robust immunity is subject to Congress's plenary power. See, e.g., Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); Newton, supra note 29, at 199-222 (1984). 
72. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("As separate sover­
eigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as uncon­
strained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal 
or state authority."); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 519 (1832) ("The In­
dian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights ...."). The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its 
origins in the English common law. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) In Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter described the common 
law doctrine as comprising two distinct, but interrelated rules: first, that the King was 
not bound to obey the law; second, that the King was not subject to jurisdiction in his 
own courts. Id. at 103-04. Only the second postulate survived to become a part of 
American jurisprudence. Id. at 103 n.2 (citing Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 
342-43 (1880)); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 010 244). This bifurcation is 
reflected in the Court's recent tribal immunity jurisprudence, which repeatedly deline­
ates between substantive tribal obligations and the remedies available to enforce them. 
See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
73. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Ouar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) ("The 
public policy which exempt[s] the dependent as well as the dominant sovereignties from 
suit without consent" supports finding tribal immunity since "Indian Nations are ex­
empt from suit without Congressional authorization." (footnote omitted)). 
74. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 759 ("Although the Court has taken the lead in 
drawing the bounds of tribal immunity, Congress ... 'has always been at liberty to 
dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.' It has not yet done so." (citation 
omitted) (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 510 (1991))). 
75. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 635. 
76. Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity; A Primer, 50 ADVOC. 19, 20 (2007). 
See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 103 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(noting that at English common law the sovereign was both beyond the substantive 
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tribe's immunity extends to its officials and employees when they 
act within their authority, it does not shield tribal officials who 
overstep the legitimate bounds of their duties.?7 Tribal immunity 
does not protect tribal members in their individual capacities, and a 
law may be enforced against individual members even though a 
tribe is shielded from the same provision.?8 Congress may unilater­
ally abrogate, and tribes may voluntarily waive, tribal immunity, but 
the intent of either government to do so must be clear and unequiv­
ocal.79 States are without power to modify or affect tribal immunity 
in any way.80 
2. Tribal Immunity in Congress and the Courts 
Although tribal immunity periodically comes under legislative 
attack,81 Congress has nevertheless "consistently reiterated its ap­
proval of the immunity doctrine."82 This support is consistent with 
the overarching federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determi­
nation, and the obligation imposed by the trust doctrine to support 
and protect tribes.83 Immunity allows tribal economic development 
to occur without the impediment of burdensome litigation, permits 
tribes to reinvigorate traditional justice systems disabled by the im­
position of European norms, and restores the recognition of tribes 
as independent political entities that characterized the early interac­
tions between Europeans and Indians.84 Protection of tribal gov­
ernments from suits and ·other legal processes is essential to the 
reach of the law and immune from its legal processes, but that only immunity from 
process crossed the Atlantic). 
77. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 636-37 (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 
59; Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997); Hardin v. White 
Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
78. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (hold­
ing that, although sovereign immunity protects a tribe from enforcement of state fish 
and game laws, the same laws may be enforced against individual tribal members). 
79. C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 418 
(2001). 
80. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). 
81. For a detailed narrative of a recent attempt to legislatively eliminate tribal 
immunity, see WILKfNS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 45, at 237-45. Spearheaded by U.S. 
Senator Slade Gorton, this attempt grew out of the belief that American Indians are 
"undeserving recipients of special rights" and needed to be restored to equal footing 
with the rest of the population. Id. at 238. 
82. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 
510 (1991). For example, § 450n of the ISDA provides that "[n]othing [in the ISDA] 
shall be construed as affecting, modifying, diminishing, or otherwise impairing the sov­
ereign immunity from suit enjoyed by an Indian tribe." 25 U.S.c. § 450n (2000). 
83. Seielstad, supra note 68, at 737. 
84. Id. at 770. 
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successful functioning of Indian communities, which depend on tri­
bal government not just for social services but for economic devel­
opment and to provide jobs as well.85 
While abrogation and waiver lie in the respective domains of 
Congress and individual tribes, it frequently falls to the federal 
courts to determine whether statutory or contractual language is 
sufficient to bring a tribal government under another sovereign's 
jurisdiction.86 In its recent Indian jurisprudence, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that Congress uses tribal im­
munity to foster Indian self-sufficiency, and has insisted that waiv­
ers and abrogation be clear and unequivocal, with ambiguities 
resolved in favor of tribal interests.87 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Marti­
nez is a useful illustration of the Court's stringent interpretive ap­
proach, and its unwillingness to find abrogation by implication.88 
In Martinez, the Court was called upon to construe the equal 
protection guarantees included in the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA).89 Declaring that the central question in the case was 
85. WILKINS & LoMAWAIMA, supra note 45, at 225-26. "Because many tribes are 
small and impoverished, [the loss] of tribal sovereign immunity would undermine tribal 
sovereignty and the federal policy of self-determination and could devastate the tribes' 
limited financial resources." /d. at 226; see also Lorie M. Graham, An interdisciplinary 
Approach to American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597 (2005) (dis­
cussing the importance of self-government and sovereign immunity for the growth of 
tribal economies). 
86. Smith, supra note 76, at 21. 
87. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 510. This is not to suggest that the 
Rehnquist Court was generally responsive to Indian claims or protective of Indian 
rights-quite the opposite is true. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The 
Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 352 (2001) (describing the Rehnquist Court's tendency to favor 
majoritarian and state interests over those of Indian tribes). Rather, the Court's reaffir­
mation of the principles of tribal sovereign immunity persisted even in the face of the 
Rehnquist Court's more restrictive jurisprudence with regard to other aspects of tribal 
sovereignty, such as regulatory authority and jurisdictional reach. Seielstad, supra note 
68, at 664-65. Even those Justices who believe that the doctrine is "an anachronistic 
fiction" acknowledge that it is "an established part of our law." Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 
U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
88. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978). 
89. The ICRA imposed on tribal governments most of the same obligations to­
ward their citizens that the Bill of Rights imposed on the federal government. Id. Julia 
Martinez, a member of the Pueblo, brought an equal protection claim against the tribal 
government. Id. at 51-52. In her suit, Martinez alleged that a tribal membership regu­
lation granting membership to the children of male tribal members born to non-mem­
ber mothers but denying membership to the children of female tribal members born to 
non-member fathers was a violation of the ICRA. Id. at 51. The relevant provision 
prohibited the Pueblo from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of its laws." Id. at 51. The effect of the Pueblo membership policy on Marti­
nez's daughters, who had grown up on the tribe's reservation and continued to live 
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whether the federal guarantee of substantive rights contained in the 
ICRA was sufficient to create an implied right of action against the 
tribe, the Court answered with an emphatic "no. "90 Because the 
only remedy authorized by the ICRA was habeas relief against an 
individual's custodian, and not the government the custodian 
served, the Court refused to go against precedent to find an implied 
right of action in the statute.91 Justice Marshall's opinion empha­
sized that the ICRA sought to fulfill two simultaneous objectives­
increasing the substantive protections available to members of In­
dian tribes and furthering the development of tribal self-reliance 
and internal governance.92 The opinion stated that 
[w]here Congress seeks to promote dual objectives in a single 
statute", courts must be more than usually hesitant to infer from 
its silence a cause of action that, while serving one legislative pur­
pose, will disserve the other. Creation of a federal cause of ac­
tion for the enforcement of rights created in [the ICRA] , 
however useful it might be in securing compliance with § 1302, 
plainly would be at odds with the congressional goal of protecting 
tribal self-government.93 
This language warns courts construing Federal Indian statutes 
not to find implicitly created enforcement mechanisms, since those 
mechanisms could serve to defeat the over arching federal policy of 
Indian self-determination.94 
Though Martinez establishes a high standard for congressional 
abrogation, courts repeatedly emphasize that statutes may explicitly 
provide for a cause of action against a tribal government without 
using the words "sovereign immunity."95 In Northern States Power 
Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, the 
Eighth Circuit found that Congress had abrogated a tribe's sover­
there as adults, was to deprive them of voting rights immediately and residency rights 
upon the event of their mother's death. [d. at 52; see also 25 U.S.c. §§ 1301-03 (2000) 
(stating that the ICRA imposed on tribal governments most of the same obligations 
toward their citizens that the Bill of Rights imposed on the federal government). 
90. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52. 
91. [d. at 58-59. 
92. [d. at 62-63. 
93. [d. at 64 (emphasis added). 
94. [d. at 61-64. 
95. C & L Enter., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 420 
(2001) (citing Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Thshie-Montgomery Assoc., Inc., 86 
F.3d 656, 659:60 (7th Cir. 1996». 
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eign immunity with regard to enforcement of the Hazardous Mater­
ials Transportation Act (HMTA).96 
The Northern States panel, while conceding the rigor imposed 
by Martinez, found the language of the HMTA sufficiently explicit 
to constitute congressional abrogation.97 The Eighth Circuit bol­
stered its holding by reference to statutory language emphasizing 
the singular federal purpose of the HMTA, which was to ensure 
uniform and administrable regulations governing the movement of 
hazardous materials.98 Additionally, the statute contained a provi­
sion allowing preemption cases arising under the HMTA to be 
brought in "any court of competent jurisdiction."99 Specific refer­
ence to the statute's application to Indian tribes, when combined 
with the stated purpose of the HMTA and the jurisdictional provi­
sion, was enough to demonstrate clear congressional intent to abro­
gate tribal sovereign immunity.1°O 
The Supreme Court has also addressed the complex issue of 
the interaction between tribal sovereign immunity and states' abil­
ity to tax economic activity occurring on Indian lands.101 In 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, the Court reaffirmed its holding that sovereign immunity did 
not relieve tribes of their "obligation to assist in the collection of 
validly imposed state sales taxes."102 The dispute in Oklahoma Tax 
Commission centered around the state's attempt to collect $2.7 mil­
lion in back taxes on cigarettes sold at a tribe-owned convenience 
store and to compel the tribe to comply with the taxation scheme in 
96. N. States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Cmty., 991 
F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1993). Northern States centered on a tribal ordinance passed by the 
Prairie Island Sioux that would have created significant obstacles for the movement of 
radioactive material to and from a nuclear power plant that could only be reached by 
crossing the tribe's land. [d. at 459. The tribe moved to enforce the ordinance, and 
answered Northern States' claim for injunctive relief with a sovereign immunity de­
fense. Id. at 459-60. 
97. Id. at 462. This explicit language stated that a rule or regulation of an "Indian 
tribe is preempted if [the] ... Indian tribe requirement as applied or enforced creates 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of" the HMTA. Id. at 460-61. 
98. [d. at 462. 
99. Id. "Congress' goal of developing a uniform, national scheme of regulation" 
would have been frustrated by enforcement of the tribal ordinance. Id. (quoting S. Pac. 
Transp. Co. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 909 F.2d 352, 358-59 (9th Cir. 1990». Congressional 
intent to fully occupy a regulatory field is frequently central to preemption analyses. 
See infra note 243 and accompanying text. 
100. N. States Power Co., 991 F.3d at 462. 
101. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n V. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505 (1991). 
102. Id. at 512. 
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the future. 103 Oklahoma argued that tribal immunity "impermissi­
bly burdens the administration of state tax laws" and should be 
eliminated entirely, or at least prevented from shielding tribes in 
their interactions with states,I04 The Court declined Oklahoma's in­
vitation to modify the scope of the immunity doctrine, instead de­
ferring to Congress and its control over Indian affairs, and noting 
that Congress "has never authorized suits [against Indian tribes] to 
enforce [ state] tax assessments. "105 Congress's reluctance to au­
thorize such suits, the Court added, reflected its commitment to tri­
bal self-determination and economic development.106 
Despite its finding that sovereign immunity prevented state en­
forcement of claims against tribal governments, the Court held that 
tribal cigarette retailers are required by law to collect taxes on sales 
to non-members and remit the funds to the state.107 Even where a 
state has such a substantive right, however, "[t]here is a difference 
between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the 
means available to enforce them. "108 This difference is at the heart 
of the sovereign immunity doctrine, which blocks the availability of 
certain remedies even in the presence of acknowledged liability.109 
The absence of a direct enforcement option, however, does not 
mean that states or other parties are without means to effect tribal 
compliance with substantive obligations. Rather, they are merely 
required to pursue compliance in a manner that respects the sover­
eign with whom they are dealing. lIo States seeking to enforce ciga­
rette taxes against tribal retailers retain a number of options that 
are consistent with tribal immunity: states may seize shipments of 
cigarettes while they are en route to triballands;111 assess taxes on 
103. Id. at 507-08. 
104. Id. at 510. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 513. 
108. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 (1998) (citing Okla. Tax 
Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514). 
109. Smith, supra note 76, at 20. 
110. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. 
111. The Court approved of this enforcement method in Washington v. Confeder­
ated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 162 (1980). While acknowledg­
ing that cigarettes were tax exempt when en route from a wholesaler to a tribal retailer, 
the Court found that the state's interest in enforcing a valid tax scheme was sufficient to 
justify seizure given the tribe's manifest unwillingness to fulfill its obligations. Id. at 
161. Important to the Court's determination was the fact that the seizure occurred 
outside of the reservation, "where state power over Indian affairs is considerably more 
expansive than it is within reservation boundaries. By seizing cigarettes en route to the 
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the wholesalers who supply cigarettes to tribal retailers, rather than 
attempt to collect from the tribe itself;112 negotiate a mutually 
agreeable tax-collection protocol with the tribe;113 sue individual 
tribal officers or agents pursuant to Ex parte Young;U4 or petition 
Congress for a federal legislative solution.u5 
Each of these enforcement options obligates states to take 
circuitous, cumbersome routes to enforce concededly valid tribal 
obligations. Oklahoma's suggestion-that the Court modify the 
immunity doctrine to prevent interference with state prerogatives­
sprang from an understandable frustration on the part of states at­
tempting to administer taxation schemes. In Oklahoma Tax Com­
mission, the Court recognized this frustration, but nevertheless 
reiterated a longstanding interpretive approach that elevates the In­
dian right to self-determination over states' desire for unimpeded 
enforcement authority. This continued deference to congressional 
intent provides yet another reminder of the exclusive federal role in 
defining tribal obligations and the important function of the courts 
in monitoring the boundaries between state authority and tribal 
separateness. 
reservation, the State [enforced] its own valid taxes without unnecessarily intruding on 
core tribal interests." Id. at 162 (citations omitted). 
112. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. 
113. Id. 
114. Ex parte Young, 209 U.s. 123 (1908). The Court's decision in Ex parte 
Young established the principle that sovereign immunity does not bar suits against state 
or tribal officers for injunctive relief, even though the granting of an injunction may 
prevent the implementation of a government policy. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 
201. The theory animating official capacity suits is that a state or tribal officer attempt­
ing to enforce an illegal policy is acting outside of her official capacity, and thus loses 
the protection afforded her by the state's immunity. Id. at 203-04. The Ex parte Young 
doctrine permits only prospective (i.e., injunctive) relief and is aimed at preventing ille­
gal conduct; it does not permit a party to collect monetary damages arising from past 
actions. Id. at 206-07. For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission, an official capacity 
suit would have enabled the state to seek future enforcement of its taxation scheme but 
would not have provided a means of recovery of the $2.7 million in back taxes owed by 
the tribe. See Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. 
115. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. For example, in 1996, frustrated by 
Narragansett attempts to build a casino over state objections, Rhode Island's congres­
sional delegation secured approval for an amendment to the Settlement Act, declaring 
that "[fjor the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, settlement lands shall 
not be treated as Indian lands." Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.c. 
§ 1708(b) (2000) (citation omitted); see also Nowlin, supra note 14, at 159-60. 
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II. THE INDIAN CANON OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. 	 Mechanics and Application of the Indian Canon of Statutory 
Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has developed specialized rules of con­
struction designed to compensate for the linguistic barriers and 
other disadvantages that were present when American Indians ne­
gotiated their treaties with the United States.116 The Indian canon 
of statutory construction protects tribal interests by interpreting 
treaties in the light most favorable to tribal interests and construing 
ambiguous statutory provisions in favor of the tribes.117 The princi­
ples of interpretation embodied in the Indian canon are meant to 
prevent the loss of Indian land and rights by anything other than 
clear congressional intent, and to uphold the federal government's 
primacy in the conduct of Indian affairs.us Although the Indian 
canon was developed to aid in the interpretation of treaties to 
which tribes were a party, the Court extended its application to ex­
ecutive orders and congressional statutes enacted unilaterally with­
out Indian input.119 
The first case to extend the Indian canon to statutes was 
Choate v. Trapp, which did so in the context of construing a tax 
exemption that Congress had provided to members of the Choctaw 
and Chickasaw tribes in order to entice them to become freehold­
ers.120 The State of Oklahoma, seeking to tax Indian lands, urged 
the Court to narrowly construe the relevant statutory language.121 
The state cited cases demonstrating an official right to remove tax 
exemptions, even in cases where a party had structured its business 
116. 	 FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 119-21. 
117. /d. at 120-21. In contrast to "plain meaning" canons of construction, Indian 
treaties and statutes should be interpreted so as to "give effect to the terms as the 
Indians themselves would have understood them." Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999). 
118. Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of Construction v. The Chevron Doc­
trine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 
CONN. L. REV. 495, 516-18 (2004). Both of these interpretive goals are animated by the 
United States' trust responsibility. /d.; see also supra notes 49-57 and accompanying 
text. Early cases posit the Court's interpretive duties with regard to the Indians as the 
embodiment of a duty to respect the sovereignty of a less powerful nation, not merely 
as a charitable gesture towards a dependent people. See Hall, supra note 118, at 517 
(citing, inter alia, In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); Worcester v. Geor­
gia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831». 
119. 	 FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 120-21. 
120. 	 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). 
121. 	 Id. at 674-75. 
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in reliance on them.122 While acknowledging this precedent, the 
Choate Court held that "in the Government's dealings with the In­
dians the rule is exactly the contrary" because the trust obligation 
requires that statutory ambiguities be resolved in favor of tribal in­
terests.123 Choate, in addition to extending treaty rules to statutes, 
made clear that the Indian canon trumps other canons that might 
otherwise control.124 
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians reiterated that "standard 
principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force in 
cases involving Indian law."125 In holding that Montana was inca­
pable of taxing the Blackfeet's oil and gas royalties, the Court noted 
that it would find congressional intent to allow state taxations of 
Indians "when Congress has manifested clearly its consent to such 
taxation."126 The insistence in Blackfeet Tribe on clear congres­
sional intent to support any finding of reduced Indian sovereignty 
or diminished land rights is consistent with the Court's long recog­
nition of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs.127 In addi­
tion, the ruling reflects the judiciary's protective attitude toward the 
tribes' separate and long-standing national identities.128 This re­
quirement of clear congressional intent means that courts must in­
terpret federal statutes as leaving all Indian rights intact if those 
statutes are silent with regard to any change in the state/tribe bal­
ance of power.129 
B. 	 Use of the Indian Canon When Federal Statutes Extend State 
Jurisdiction to Indian Lands 
The Indian canon plays an important role whenever courts ap­
proach a federal statute that extends state jurisdiction to Indian 
lands. Grants of state authority over Indians and their lands create 
an inherent tension with the trust doctrine's invocation of federal 
power as a protection for tribes against state incursions.13o For this 
122. 	 Id. 
123. 	 Id. at 675. 
124. 	 Hall, supra note 118, at 514. 
125. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 417 U.S. 759,766 (1985). Blackfeet 
Tribe involved the state's attempt to levy taxes on fees that the tribe charged third 
parties operating oil and gas operations on tribal lands. Id. at 761-63. 
126. 	 Id. at 766. 
127. 	 Hall, supra note 118, at 517-18. 
128. 	 Id. 
129. 	 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 n.14 (1982). 
130. 	 See, e.g., Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759. 
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reason, courts traditionally subject such statutes to searching 
examination. 
An example of the Court's interpretive approach to such stat­
utes is Bryan v. Itasca County, in which the county argued that a 
federal law authorized state taxation of on-reservation real and per­
sonal property belonging to Indians.l3l After examining the legisla­
tive history of the statute at issue, the Court found that Congress 
had acted to extend state civil jurisdiction to the Indians' lands be­
cause of insufficient civil adjudicatory venues on reservations.132 
The Court declined to find a congressional grant of civil regulatory 
authority to the state and noted that the law was enacted to provide 
for civil enforcement of private rights and obligations solely on 
those Indian reservations that lacked the financial resources to do 
so independently.133 Nothing in the statutory language purported 
to subject the tribes themselves to state civil jurisdiction. Conse­
quently, the Bryan Court was unwilling to read in congressional in­
tent to diminish the tribes' sovereign status.134 
In 1999, the Court reaffirmed the vitality of the Indian canon 
and cautioned against broad construction of provisions purporting 
to diminish tribal rights.135 In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, the Court interpreted an 1855 treaty under 
which the Chippewa relinquished all title to the United States, and 
refused to find that the treaty had extinguished the use and enjoy­
ment rights reserved to the Chippewa under an earlier agree­
ment,136 Although these use and enjoyment rights would appear to 
come within the ambit of "any and all right[s]," as stated in the 
statute, the Court found that the treaty's failure to mention them at 
all meant that they were beyond the contemplation of the treaty 
entirely, and not lumped in with the rest of the rights generally re­
131. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,377 (1976) (citing 28 U.S.c. § 1360(a) 
(2000)). The statute provides that state laws "of general application to private persons 
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as 
they have elsewhere within the State." 28 U.S.c. § 1360(a). 
132. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 381-85. 
133. Id. at 385-86. 
134. Id. at 388-89. 
135. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
136. Id. at 195-96. The language that the Court was asked to interpret stated that 
the Chippewa "fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and all 
right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may now 
have." Id. at 195 (citing Treaty with the Chippewas, Art. 1, 10 Stat. 1165, 1166 (Feb. 22, 
1855)). 
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linquished.137 The Court premised this deference to Indian rights 
on an interpretive approach that looks beyond the plain language of 
treaties and statutes and instead draws meaning from the larger his­
torical context in which an agreement became law.138 In addition, 
the Mille Lacs Court noted that the United States was a sophisti­
cated party capable of protecting its interests with appropriate lan­
guage-as it had done in a contemporaneous treaty that expressly 
abrogated another tribe's usufructuary rights-and its ability to do 
so prohibited the Court from finding such meaning implicitly.B9 
Despite the beneficial reading of treaties and statutes provided 
by the Indian canon, courts will enforce provisions that unambigu­
ously diminish or eliminate American Indian rights or property.140 
Otherwise, in the face of unclear congressional intent, the Indian 
canon is applied, and the legislation must be interpreted in light of 
the federal government's trust obligations and longstanding com­
mitment to respecting the retained sovereignty of Indian tribes.141 
What the Indian canon requires is that, in order to find statutory 
diminishment of rights, courts must find clear evidence that Con­
gress considered a particular piece of legislation's impact on tribal 
rights and decided to pass it anyway.142 
III. THE NARRAGANSETT TRIBE AND THE 
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 
A. From First Contact to the Smoke Shop Raid 
Today's Narragansett Indians are the descendants of two 
tribes, the Narragansett and the Niantic, whose aboriginal territory 
137. Id. at 198 ("This silence suggests that the Chippewa did not understand the 
proposed Treaty to abrogate their usufructuary rights .... It is difficult to believe that 
... the Chippewa would have agreed to relinquish the usufructuary rights they had 
fought [for previously] without at least a passing word about the relinquishment."). 
138. Id. at 196. The Court stated that "to determine whether this language abro­
gates Chippewa Treaty rights, we look beyond the written words to the larger context 
that frames the Treaty ...." Id. The Court continued, noting that the context "is 
especially helpful to the extent that it sheds light on how the Chippewa signatories to 
the Treaty understood the agreement because we interpret Indian treaties to give effect 
to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them." Id. 
139. Id. at 195. Under the contested treaty, the tribe '''surrender[ed] to the 
United States the right of fishing ... secured to them by [a previous] treaty.'" Id. at 
195-96 (quoting Treaty with the Chippewa of Sault Ste. Marie, art. 1, 11 Stat. 631, 631 
(1855)). 
140. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 28, at 121. 
141. Hall, supra note 118, at 541-42. 
142. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986). 
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included much of present-day Rhode Island.143 At the time of Eu­
ropean arrival, the Narragansett, who numbered between thirty­
and forty-thousand, survived by hunting, fishing, gathering wild 
food, and maintaining gardens.144 The first permanent European 
settlements in Narragansett territory were built in the early seven­
teenth century and did not occasion significant conflict between In­
dians and whites.145 Early interactions between Great Britain and 
the Narragansett followed an international model, with the Narra­
gansett treated as an independent sovereign.146 
The colonists and the Narragansett lived peacefully for most of 
the seventeenth century, but tensions escalated as European settle­
ments began to encroach on the territories of the Narragansett and 
other New England tribes,147 In 1675, when colonial courts at­
tempted to assert jurisdiction over three native men, these simmer­
ing resentments exploded into King Philip's War.148 Although the 
conflict took lives on all sides, the Narragansett suffered terribly. 
They lost nearly all their land, and their numbers were reduced to 
several hundred from a pre-war population of five to seven thou­
sand with many of the survivors enslaved.149 
Those Narragansett who remained free kept up a sporadic re­
sistance until 1709, when the remnants of the tribe came under the 
control of the colony of Rhode Island. As a part of this arrange­
ment, under which the Narragansett essentially became wards of 
the state, the tribe quitclaimed its interest in all its former territory 
save a sixty-four square mile tract near present-day Charlestown, 
143. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Feb. 10, 1983). 
144. WILLIAM S. SIMMONS, THE NARRAGANSETI 16-19 (Frank W. Porter III ed., 
1989). 
145. Id. at 19-20. Even though these groups lived together amicably, European 
diseases, especially smallpox, had an immediate and severe impact on the native popu­
lation. Id. 
146. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6177-05. 
147. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 35-46. For an in-depth discussion of the dynam­
ics between colonists and Indians in seventeenth-century New England, see Clinton, 
supra note 19, at 1064-98. 
148. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 47-48; Yasuhide Kawashima, The Pilgrims and 
the Wampanoag Indians, 1620-1691: Legal Encounter, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 115, 
119 (1998). Prior to the colonists' jurisdictional assertion, Indian and European legal 
systems had operated independently. When cases arose that implicated the interests of 
both societies, tribal and colonial leaders negotiated resolutions to jurisdictional ques­
tions. [d. at 117-20. 
149. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 47. The pre-war Narragansett population re­
flected the devastation already wrought by European disease. Id. at 19-20. 
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Rhode Island.150 The Narragansett remained on their Charlestown 
lands until 1880, when the State of Rhode Island "detribalized" 
themI5I and purchased all but two acres of their land for five thou­
sand dollars.152 For most of the following century, the detribalized 
Narragansett people lived quietly in a corner of the land that their 
ancestors had ruled.153 
The quiet broke in 1975, when the Narragansett asserted ab­
original claims to 3200 acres surrounding Charlestown, alleging that 
their land had been improperly alienated in violation of the Indian 
Non-Intercourse Act.l54 After a federal court determined that the 
Narragansett had a valid claim, the titles of thousands of private 
Rhode Island landowners became clouded by the potential of a su­
perior title.155 The Narragansett continued to press their claims and 
eventually negotiated a settlement with the state, in which the tribe 
received 1800 acres of land in the heart of their former territory in 
exchange for the extinguishment of all other Indian land claims in 
the state.156 Congress memorialized this agreement in the Rhode 
Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (Settlement Act).157 
As part of the Settlement Act, Rhode Island agreed to charter 
the nonprofit Narragansett Indian Land Management Corporation 
(Corporation), which would be run by tribal members and used to 
manage the land.158 The state law creating the Corporation was 
later amended to allow for termination of the Corporation's charter 
150. Id. at 54. The agreement provided that the tribe could not alienate its re­
maining lands without Rhode Island's consent. Id. 
151. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6178. 
152. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 73-74. 
153. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 296 F. Supp. 2d 153, 161 (D.R.1. 
2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005), affd en bane, 449 F.3d 16 
(1st Cir. 2006). 
154. Id. at 161-62; see also Indian Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 161, § 12,4 Stat. 729, 
730-31 (1834) (codified at 25 U.S.c. § 177 (2000» (invalidating any conveyances of land 
from Indians to non-Indians except those made pursuant to a federal law or treaty). 
The Narragansett claims were part of a larger American Indian Civil Rights Movement 
in which Indian activists sought to revive native cultures and secure the benefits of 
earlier laws and treaties. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 78-82. 
155. See Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S. R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 
798 (D.R.1. 1976); William T. Hagan, "To Correct Certain Evils:" The Indian Land 
Claims Cases, in IROQUOIS LAND CLAIMS 17, 26 (Christopher Vecsey & William A. 
Starna eds., 1988). 
156. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 161; SIMMONS, supra note 144, 
at 86. The 1800 acres recovered represents approximately four percent of the land the 
Narragansett lost to the state because of the 1880 detribalization. Id. 
157. 25 U.S.c. §§ 1707-16 (2000). 
158. SIMMONS, supra note 144, at 83. 
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and subsequent transfer of the settlement lands directly to the Nar­
ragansett if the tribe were to achieve federal acknowledgment.159 
The Settlement Act also provided that "the settlement lands shall 
be subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State 
of Rhode Island."160 
The Narragansett received federal acknowledgment on Febru­
ary 10, 1983.161 At that time, the Corporation ceased to exist, and 
title in the settlement lands passed to the tribe.162 However, the 
state and the tribe continued to have problems. For nearly twenty 
years these conflicts centered around the tribe's desire to realize 
economic self-sufficiency by constructing a casino on its settlement 
lands.163 In 2003, strained by budgetary shortfalls that threatened 
the tribal government's ability to provide basic services, the Narra­
gansett opened a tax-free smoke ShOp.164 Two days later, Rhode 
Island state police arrived with a warrant to shut it down, seizing 
cash and cigarettes, and arresting eight tribal members, including 
the tribe's chief sachem.165 
B. The Smoke Shop Dispute in the Courts 
1. The United States District Court Decision 
Six months after the Rhode Island State Police raided the Nar­
ragansett smoke shop, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Rhode Island held that Rhode Island was within its rights when it 
took direct enforcement action against the tribe.166 The district 
159. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 162 (citing RI. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 37-18-12, -13 (1997». 
160. 25 U.S.c. § 1708. 
161. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Feb. 10, 1983). 
Bureau of Indian Affairs regulations provide that a "newly acknowledged tribe shall be 
considered a historic tribe and shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities available 
to other federally recognized historic tribes by virtue of their government-to-government 
relationship with the United States." Procedures for Establishing that an American 
Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe: Implementation of Decisions, 25 C.F.R § 83.12 
(2008) (emphasis added); see infra notes 223-226 for general discussion about federal 
acknowledgment. 
162. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 296 F. Supp. 2d. at 162. The tribe later passed 
legal title to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which currently holds the land in trust. Id. at 
162-63. 
163. See generally Nowlin, supra note 14, at 151 (reviewing the history of the 
state-tribe casino conflict). 
164. Zachary R Mider, Weary of Waiting, Defiant Tribe Starts Selling Cigarettes, 
PROVIDENCE J., July 13, 2003, at AI, available at 2003 WLNR 6559929. 
165. Mulvaney & Davis, supra note 3. 
166. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
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court avoided ruling on the difficult issue of whether the tribe itself 
was subject to state taxation by finding that the tribe was only obli­
gated to collect, rather than pay, the cigarette tax,167 This finding 
sidestepped the thorny implications of the state's enforcement ac­
tions by positing that the state police had acted against the tribe 
solely in its capacity as a retailer, not as a sovereign,168 Relying on 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of Coleville Indian Reservation169 and Nevada v. Hicks,170 
the district court held that Rhode Island's regulatory interest out­
weighed the Narragansett's interest as a retailer of cigarettes in the 
particular factual context of the smoke shop dispute,171 
Although the district court emphasized that its holding did not 
imply unlimited state enforcement power on the Narragansett 
lands, it found that the operation of a tax-free smoke shop was not 
a sovereign right. Consequently no bar existed to direct state law 
enforcement action against the tribe.172 Since the tribe was obli­
gated under the terms of the Settlement Act and Rhode Island law 
to participate in the collection of taxes on cigarettes it sold to non­
members, the state had the right to take action to enforce that obli­
gationP3 Essential to the district court's analysis was its determin­
ation that the tribal activity in question was not inherently 
governmental or political in nature; indeed, direct action was not 
barred by sovereign immunity because Rhode Island took action 
against the tribe as a retailer, not as a sovereign.174 While the dis­
trict court allowed that the state could have chosen to pursue en­
forcement means that were "more respectful of the Tribe's 
sovereignty," its opinion stated that judicial consideration of the ap­
167. Id. at 156. 
168. Id. at 168-71. 
169. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Coleville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 
134 (1980). In Coleville, the Court found that Washington State's interest in enforcing 
its cigarette tax laws was sufficiently strong to justify the off-reservation seizure of un­
taxed cigarettes en route to a reservation smoke shop. Id. at 161. The Court declined 
to reach the question whether the state's interest was strong enough to justify a similar 
seizure on-reservation. Id. at 162. 
170. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). The Hicks Court held that state intru­
sion onto Indian lands could be justified when a significant off-reservation state interest 
was implicated. Id. at 362. The opinion discussed state regulation of the activities of 
individual tribal members, but did not discuss direct enforcement action against a tribe 
itself. Id. 
171. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 296 F. Supp. at 170-73. 
172. Id. at 176-77. 
173. Id. at 177. 
174. Id. 
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propriateness of Rhode Island's action was unnecessary, since the 
balance of interests weighed so heavily in favor of the state.175 
2. 	 The Panel Decision of the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit 
On appeal, however, a three-justice panel of the First Circuit 
disagreed. Although it upheld the district court's finding of a sub­
stantive tribal obligation to collect cigarette taxes, it disagreed that 
Rhode Island could take direct enforcement action against the 
tribe.176 Reaching a question that the district court declined to con­
sider, the First Circuit found that Congress had not abrogated the 
Narragansett's sovereign immunity when it passed the Settlement 
Act.177 While the district court had balanced the tribe-as-retailer's 
right to resist compliance with the state's tax scheme against the 
state's right to regulate the sale of tobacco, the First Circuit "bal­
ance[d] the State's interest in enforcing its cigarette laws with the 
Tribe's sovereignty interests and related interests in tribal economic 
development and self-governance."178 Appreciating how each 
court frames the relevant interests is essential to understanding the 
different outcomes that the courts reached. The district court con­
sidered the smoke shop venture to be inherently separate from the 
tribe's retained sovereignty and right to self-determination, and 
hence unprotected. Yet, to the First Circuit, the tribe's economic 
actions were inseparable from its right to self-govern, and hence 
could not be subject to state action unless Congress had abrogated 
the tribe's sovereign immunity. 
The First Circuit's holding was hardly radical-it found the 
Narragansett bound to obey Rhode Island law and collect cigarette 
taxes on sales to non-tribal customers for remittance to the state,179 
In addition, the court found that under the terms of the Settlement 
Act, the state was empowered to take law enforcement action on 
the Narragansett lands, subject only to the limitations on remedy 
imposed by the tribe's still-extant sovereign immunity.180 The First 
175. Id. at 177 n.34. 
176. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005), rev'd 
en bane, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006). 
177. Id. at 466. 
178. Id. at 465. 
179. Id. at 460-61. 
180. Id. The court characterized § 1708 as "providing for the continued applica­
bility of Rhode Island's civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction over the settlement 
lands," essentially interpreting the statute to have codified the legal status quo that 
existed prior to the settlement. Id. at 461. 
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Circuit's conclusion that the Narragansett possessed sufficient im­
munity to bar direct state enforcement action was premised in its 
interpretation of § 1708 of the Settlement ACt.18I While acknowl­
edging that § 1708 conferred on Rhode Island the right and ability 
to enforce its laws on the Narragansett lands, the court noted that it 
does not expressly address the issue of sovereign immunity, and 
it would be inappropriate for us to infer that the congressional 
grant of jurisdiction to the State acts as a wholesale abrogation of 
the Tribe's sovereign immunity. It is well settled that "statutes 
are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambigu­
ous provisions interpreted to their benefit." In fact, the language 
of Section 1708 does not purport to waive any of the Tribe's 
rights.182 
Grounding its interpretation in basic principles of Federal In­
dian law-the Indian canonI83 and the requirement of unequivocal 
congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunityl84-the 
First Circuit declined to conflate the tribe's obligations under 
Rhode Island law with the state's right to enforce those 
obligations.185 
3. En Bane Rehearing 
Notwithstanding the panel's limited holding, the First Circuit 
ordered rehearing en bane, restricted to the question of the state's 
right to take direct enforcement action against the tribe, and re­
versed.186 The en banc court rejected the panel's description of the 
interests at stake in the litigation, asserting that "the State's interest 
in maintaining the integrity of [its cigarette taxation] scheme con­
trasts favorably with the Tribe's interest in operating the smoke 
shop as a tax haven," which the en banc court characterized as "not 
181. 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (2000). 
182. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 407 F.3d at 461-62 (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
183. See supra Part I1.A. 
184. See supra notes 86·109 and accompanying text. 
185. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 407 F.3d at 466. The court based the distinction 
between substantive rights and the means available to enforce them on the Supreme 
Court's holding in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). The Court's insistence that congressional action creating 
substantive rights against Indian tribes does not automatically make enforcement mech­
anisms available is a staple of tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence. See, e.g., Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
186. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
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impressive."187 In the en banc court's opinion, once the Narragan­
sett's obligation to participate in the collection of state taxes was 
conclusively established, it became impossible "to identify any legit­
imate reason for resisting state enforcement of the scheme. "188 The 
en banc court, unlike the First Circuit panel, conflated Rhode Is­
land's right to demand compliance with its ability to enforce it.189 
The court's insistence that the Narragansett must have a reason to 
resist the state's enforcement action begs the question of sovereign 
immunity itself-a sovereign is immune from enforcement mea­
sures by its nature, and needs no reasons to assert its rights. 
After the en banc court determined that the existence of a le­
gal obligation on the part of the tribe necessarily established an en­
forcement mechanism in the state,190 it proceeded to find that the 
tribe had voluntarily waived, and that Congress had expressly abro­
gated, the Narragansett's sovereign immunity by means of the Set­
tlement Act.191 Neither the Settlement Act itself, nor its legislative 
history, makes mention of sovereign immunity or discusses the im­
pact federal recognition might have on the tribe's status vis-a-vis 
§ 1708's jurisdictional grant. However, the court concluded that the 
circumstances surrounding the negotiated agreement between 
Rhode Island and the Narragansett left room for no other conclu­
sion.192 In the en banc court's analysis, to interpret the mutual 
agreement between Rhode Island and the Narragansett as main­
taining the tribe's immunity from state civil and criminal process 
187. Id. at 23. 
188. Id. (emphasis added). 
189. Id. 
190. As recently as 1998, the Supreme Court explicitly differentiated between a 
state's right to demand tribal compliance with its laws and a state's remedial options 
with respect to a non-compliant tribe. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 755 
(1998) (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514). 
191. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 23. 
192. Id. at 25. While it conceded that congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign 
immunity must be unequivocal, the en banc opinion relied for its circumstantial finding 
of abrogation on indications by the Supreme Court that "an effective limitation on tri­
bal sovereign immunity need not use magic words." Id. (citing C & L Enters. Inc. v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 U.S. 411, 420-21 (2001)). C & L Enterprises 
dealt with a contractual provision in which a tribe agreed by explicit language to submit 
to binding arbitration of disputes arising from the contract. The waiver at issue was 
discrete and limited in scope, unlike the abrogation found by the Narragansett Indian 
Tribe en banc opinion. C & L Enterprises, 532 U.s. at 420. The C & L Enterprises 
Court did not look to external circumstances to determine whether the tribe had waived 
its immunity but rather held that language could constitute an explicit waiver without 
actually using the words "sovereign immunity." Id. (citing Sokagon Gaming Enter. Co. 
v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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would "defy common sense" and deprive the state of its most signif­
icant consideration.193 The court bolstered this finding by asserting 
that, at the time Congress enacted the Settlement Act, states were 
already permitted to exercise jurisdiction on Indian lands in the ab­
sence of federal preemption.194 Thus, the court reasoned, § 1708 
must confer jurisdiction over something other than the Narragan­
sett lands, which the state would have had in any case. In order to 
avoid construing § 1708 as merely surplus language, the court con­
cluded that it must be intended to limit the Narragansett's sover­
eign immunity.l95 
IV. INSIDE THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S MISTAKEN ANALYSIS 
The First Circuit's en banc holding in Narragansett Indian Tribe 
v. Rhode Island is the result of a misinterpretation of the history of 
the state-tribe dispute and a misapplication of the animating princi­
ples of Federal Indian law.l96 This section begins by presenting the 
Narragansett claim as what it truly is-part of a larger struggle to 
reclaim national and cultural identity. It continues by focusing on 
the federal government's 1983 acknowledgment of the Narragansett 
Indian Tribe in 1983, and demonstrates how the particular circum­
stances of the claim and settlement militate against, not for, a find­
ing of congressional abrogation. Next, this section assesses how the 
First Circuit's holding is an untoward departure from relevant Su­
preme Court precedent at the time of the Settlement Act. Finally, 
this Note concludes with an application of the Indian canon of con­
struction to the Settlement Act, and a suggestion that its use would 
have better allowed the First Circuit to protect all the rights and 
interests implicated in Narragansett Indian Tribe. 
A. 	 The Narragansett Claim: A People Seek to Regain What They 
Have Lost 
The First Circuit's characterization of the Settlement Act is 
premised on a fundamental misstatement regarding the nature of 
the Narragansett claim.197 The Narragansett claim is properly un­
derstood not as a conflict over title to a particular piece of land, but 
193. 	 Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 25. 
194. 	 Id. at 26. 
195. 	 Id. 
196. 	 See id. at 23. 
197. The en banc court insisted that surrender of the tribe's sovereign immunity 
was an essential part of the agreement that allowed the Narragansett to recapture a 
portion of their ancestral lands. Id. at 22 (In the course of the negotiations leading to 
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as an historic attempt by a disenfranchised people to regain a mea­
sure of the independence and national identity that once was 
theirs.198 The Narragansett claim arose not as a freestanding legal 
dispute, but in the context of a larger American Indian civil rights 
movement in which numerous tribes took to the federal courts, 
seeking to recover lost lands and hold the federal government to its 
long-neglected trust obligation.199 
Like the claims of several other eastern tribes, the Narragan­
sett claim arose in the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida that Indian land claims 
were a matter of federal law, immune from state statutes of limita­
tion.20o This judicial reaffirmation of the first principles of Indian 
law reinvigorated the notion of federal supremacy in Indian affairs 
and imperiled the private titles to millions of acres of land in the 
eastern United States.201 The tribes' position with regard to these 
extensive claims was strengthened further by the conclusion of the 
Interior and Justice Departments that the trust responsibility re­
quired the federal government to assist the eastern tribes in the 
maintenance of suits for possession of improperly alienated lands, 
as well as for trespass damages.202 
The First Circuit ignored the historical context in which the 
eastern land claims arose, and underestimated the value to Rhode 
Island of seeing those claims extinguished, suggesting that the most 
valuable consideration the state received under the Settlement Act 
the Settlement Act, "the Tribe abandoned any right to an autonomous enclave, submit­
ting itself to state law as a quid pro quo for obtaining the land that it cherished. "). 
198. See Getches, supra note 87, at 352 (discussing the federal judiciary's ten­
dency to misunderstand the nature of Indian claims by treating tribes as racial minori­
ties clamoring for special rights, rather than as sovereigns seeking to recover the 
governmental status of which they have been unjustly deprived). 
199. See generally The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 254, 254-64 (1985) (discussing the legal context in which the eastern tribes' land 
claims arose); TIm Vollmann, A Survey of Eastern Indian Land Claims: 1970-1979, 31 
ME. L. REV. 5 (1979) (discussing the chronology and federal response to the eastern 
tribes' land claims). 
200. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661, 677-81 
(1974). 
201. Id; Vollmann, supra note 199, at 10 n.30. 
202. Vollmann, supra note 199, at 10 (citing Memorandum in Support of Plain­
tiff's Motion for Further Extension of TIme to Report to the Court at 9, United States 
v. Maine, Nos. 1966, 1969 (D. Me. July 1, 1972, July 17, 1972». Interestingly, one of the 
first cases to hold that the trust relationship compelled federal action in support of the 
eastern land claims was a First Circuit case. See Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy 
Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975). 
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was the tribe's submission to Rhode Island law.203 The threat 
presented to state and private landowners by the eastern land 
claims should not be reduced in hindsight; after the Narragansett 
filed their initial claim in 1975, much of the economy of Charles­
town, Rhode Island was paralyzed.204 The construction and real es­
tate industries, on which the seasonal seacoast community 
depended, "ground to a halt" as potential purchasers of real prop­
erty were unable to buy title insurance.205 
The turmoil foisted on the area by the Narragansett claim 
seeped into other areas of the economy as well. No eastern land 
claims had been resolved at the time of the Narragansett filing, and 
the uncertainty created by the suit reached far beyond the lands 
mentioned in the claim, clouding the titles of private landowners 
throughout the area.206 This threat only increased when the Rhode 
Island District Court held that the Narragansett had a valid claim 
against both state and private landowners under the Non-Inter­
course Act.207 Section 1701 of the Settlement Act, which contains 
Congress's findings and declaration of policy, explicitly states that 
the Act's purpose is to remove clouds from the titles to all affected 
land (including land not directly implicated in the litigation) and to 
relieve the economic distress created by the Narragansett claim.208 
No mention is made of the legal status of the as-yet unacknowl­
edged tribe.209 
203. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(en bane) (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
204. Hagan, supra note 155, at 26. 
205. [d. For example, the municipal government was forced to borrow money at 
short-term bank rates because the uncertainty of local title made it unable to make a 
successful bond issue. [d. 
206. 25 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Katharine F. Nelson, Resolving Native American 
Land Claims and the Eleventh Amendment: Changing the Balance of Power, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 525, 565 (1994). 
207. See Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S. R.!. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 
798, 803-06 (D.R.!. 1976); see also supra note 155. 
208. 25 U.S.c. § 1701. Congress found that 
[T]he pendency of [the Narragansett claims] has resulted in severe economic 
hardships for the residents of the town of Charlestown by clouding the titles to 
much of the land in the town, including lands not involved in the lawsuits ... 
Congress shares with the State of Rhode Island and the parties to the lawsuits 
a desire to remove all clouds on titles resulting from such Indian land claims 
within the State of Rhode Island .... 
[d. § 1701(b)-(c); see supra notes 147-160 and accompanying text for a further discus­
sion of the litigation and negotiations that led up to the Settlement Act. 
209. See infra notes 229-237 and accompanying text. 
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An examination of the Settlement Act's legislative history 
makes clear that Congress's intent in enacting the statute was to 
remove the clouds from local titles and provide for the extinguish­
ment of all potential future American Indian land claims in Rhode 
Island.210 After summarizing the nature of the Narragansett claim 
and noting the relatively favorable position from which the tribe 
was negotiating, the House Report goes on to explain that the Set­
tlement Act is "premised on the voluntary relinquishment of their 
claims by the Tribe and the provision of fair compensation for that 
relinquishment."211 Yet, the legislative history repeatedly empha­
sizes that the Settlement Act memorializes the parties' intention to 
"clear non-Indian title to non-settlement lands claimed by the 
Tribe"212 and that the settlement "will clear the title of all present­
day landowners who trace their claim of title back to the transfers" 
made in violation of the Non-Intercourse ACt.213 Nowhere in the 
Act is there a mention of Congress's intention to confer, or of 
Rhode Island's attempt to gain, state jurisdiction over anything 
other than land as part of the settlement. 
Congress's other prominent concern appears to have been to 
state definitively that the legitimacy of the Narragansett claim did 
not imply any liability on the part of the federal government for 
third-party violations of the Non-Intercourse Act.214 What is nota­
bly absent from the legislative history is any mention of state au­
thority over the tribe itself-what the en banc opinion asserts was 
the primary consideration that Rhode Island received under the 
Settlement Act.215 While the legislative history notes that the Set­
tlement Act "provides for state civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
210. H.R. REP. No. 95-1453 (1978), reprinted in 1978 u.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 1949. 
The Supreme Court requires clear and unambiguous congressional intent to support a 
finding of abrogation. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
211. H.R. REp. No. 95-1453, at 7-8 (emphasis added). In other words, the legisla­
ture viewed the consideration for the agreement as "the tribe gave up its claims, and the 
state gave up its portion of the settlement lands," not "the tribe gave up its sovereign 
immunity, and the state gave up its portion of the settlement lands." Id. 
212. Id. at 7. 
213. Id. at 12. 
214. Id. at 8. 
215. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(en banc). While the en banc opinion repeatedly asserts that the surrounding circum­
stances make abrogation the only reasonable interpretation of the Settlement Act, the 
court makes no attempt to square this conclusion with the Supreme Court's admonition 
against assuming that legislation strips Indian tribes of rights or privileges without ex­
plicitly so indicating. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text. 
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the settlement lands,"216 it nowhere mentions state power over the 
tribe itself-an unsurprising fact, given that the Narragansett did 
not receive federal acknowledgment, and hence did not exist as a 
government in the federal view, until five years after the Settlement 
ACt.217 
The Settlement Act was the first negotiated resolution to an 
eastern land claim brought under the Non-Intercourse Act, and it is 
important to remember when construing its provisions that none of 
the parties knew what would occur if the claims were judicially re­
solved.218 A reasonable assumption, however, is that the initial suc­
cess for the tribe, and defeat for the state, in federal court219 
emboldened the Narragansett to persist in legal action and en­
couraged Rhode Island to seek a negotiated settlement, lest the 
tribe continue to prevail in litigation. Rhode Island was surely act­
ing at the prodding of many of its citizens, whose concerns were 
about the security of their own fee interests, not the state's future 
law enforcement relationship with an as-yet unacknowledged In­
dian tribe. Negotiations between Rhode Island and the Narragan­
sett took place in an atmosphere of uproar that reflected the panic 
created in the eastern United States by the realization that legiti­
mate Indian land claims could imperil millions of private acres.220 
The circumstances surrounding the eastern tribes' land claims, 
and the uncertainty the claims injected into property rights thought 
to be long-settled, suggest that both Congress and Rhode Island 
intended that the Settlement Act extinguish the tribe's claims 
before other, more far-reaching concessions were required. Noth­
ing in the legislative history of the Settlement Act nor the particular 
facts of the Narragansett claim implies either that Rhode Island 
sought or that Congress bestowed jurisdiction over the tribe itself. 
216. H.R REP. No. 95-1453, at 12. As enacted, the Settlement Act provides that 
"the settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of 
the State of Rhode Island." 25 U.S.c. § 1708(a) (2000). 
217. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177,6178 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Feb. 10, 1983). 
218. H.R REP. No. 95-1453, at 7; Nelson, supra note 206, at 563-64. 
219. See Narragansett Tribe v. S. RI. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 
1976) (holding that the Narragansett had a valid claim under the Non-Intercourse Act). 
220. Vollmann, supra note 199, at 11 ("[T]he Interior Department was besieged 
with calls and letters from anxious property owners and concerned Congressmen" 
alarmed about the threat the eastern land claims posed to state and private titles.). 
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B. 	 Congressional Interest, Tribal Interest: Federal 
Acknowledgment Is Inconsistent With State Jurisdiction 




The federal government's 1983 acknowledgment of the Narra­
gansett Indian Tribe speaks to an ongoing restoration of govern­
mental relations between the tribe and the United States, and is 
fundamentally inconsistent with a finding of congressional abroga­
tion.221 Some of the primary goals of the federal self-determination 
policy, which provides context for both the Settlement Act and the 
1983 acknowledgment of the Narragansett, are the preservation and 
strengthening of tribal governments.222 For the Narragansett, the 
Settlement Act and federal acknowledgment are parts of the same 
historical action-the restoration to a sovereign people of the land 
and political identity that are rightfully theirs. The course of deal­
ing between Congress, Rhode Island, and the Narragansett demon­
strates an ongoing federal intent to deliver the tribe from its 
entangled history with the state, not to countenance the state's 
wrongful assumption of authority. 
Federal acknowledgment means that the United States recog­
nizes an American Indian tribe as a "domestic dependent nation[]" 
to which it owes trust obligations and whose inherent sovereignty it 
is bound to respect.223 Acknowledgment also entitles a tribe to bi­
lateral government-to-government relations with the United 
22l. Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian 
Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6178; see also Procedures for Establishing that an 
American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe: Mandatory Criteria for Federal Ac­
knowledgment, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (2008). In order to be eligible for federal acknowledg­
ment, an American Indian group must prove: that it "comprises a distinct community 
and has existed as a community from historical times until the present"; that it has 
"maintained political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity 
from historical times until the present"; and that its "membership consists of individuals 
who descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes which com­
bined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity." 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b)-(c), 
(e) (emphases added). The Narragansett's federal acknowledgment noted that the once 
large and powerful tribe had maintained an autonomous existence since the first Euro­
pean contact, with its political institutions and community life centered on the lands 
that comprise the property recovered under the Settlement Act. Final Determination 
for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island, 48 Fed. 
Reg. at 6178. 
222. 	 See supra Part I.A.3. 
223. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); William W. 
Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of American India'.! Tribes: Authority, Judicial In­
terposition, and 25 C.F.R. § 83,17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 37, 39 (1992). 
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States.224 Upon receiving federal acknowledgment, a tribe is enti­
tled to all the privileges and immunities that have traditionally at­
tached to governmental entities, qualified only by Congress's 
plenary power in the realm of Indian affairs.225 Among the privi­
leges and immunities guaranteed by federal acknowledgment is sov­
ereign immunity, which is recognized as "a necessary corollary to 
[the] Indian sovereignty and self-governance" that it is congres­
sional policy to nurture.226 
Economic development and political autonomy are intimately 
connected in both the congressional and Indian views of the trust 
relationship.227 Sovereign immunity plays an essential role in tribal 
economic development: it protects small tribal economies from the 
potentially devastating effects of costly litigation and encourages 
other entities, especially states, to resolve conflicts with tribes 
through negotiation rather than litigation.228 Protection from legal 
processes is especially important in the context of Indian self-gov­
ernment because tribal governments play so many different roles in 
the lives of their people. They supply social services, administer 
legal systems, and run businesses.229 All of these functions could be 
financially imperiled if a tribe were to lose its sovereign immunity. 
Clearly, Congress has made promoting American Indian eco­
nomic self-sufficiency a cornerstone of Federal Indian policy. Thus, 
it is unlikely that the Settlement Act, promulgated only three years 
after the powerful statement of policy contained in the ISDA,230 
would "provide[ ] the Indians with an opportunity to acquire a via­
ble land base" from which to stage their resurgence while at the 
same time withdrawing such an essential protection for develop­
224. Quinn, Jr., supra note 223, at 38. 
225. 25 C.F.R. § 83.12. 
226. Three Affiliated Tribes of Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 
890 (1986). 
227. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 
25 U.S.C § 450 (2000); Graham, supra note 85 (explaining that economic development 
is an essential component of the modern movement toward indigenous self­
determination). 
228. Seielstad, supra note 68, at 770-71. 
229. WILKINS & LoMAWAIMA, supra note 45, at 225-26. The Narragansett chose 
to open their smoke shop under budgetary pressure that threatened the tribe's ability to 
provide police services and maintain programs for tribal youth and elderly. Mider, 
supra note 164. 
230. In the ISDA's statement of policy, Congress affirmed that "the United States 
is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and 
stable tribal governments, capable of administering quality programs and developing 
the economies of their respective communities." 25 U.S.c. § 450a(b). 
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ment as tribal sovereign immunity.231 Although the text of the Set­
tlement Act makes no explicit reference to sovereign immunity, or 
the tribe's susceptibility to state legal process, its legislative history 
briefly addresses the effect federal acknowledgment would have on 
the settlement lands. The House Report says "the settlement lands 
will be subject to a special Federal restraint on alienation only if the 
Secretary [of the Interior] subsequently acknowledges the tribe's 
existence."232 This special federal restraint on alienation is a mani­
festation of the federal government's trust obligation to protect 
American Indian autonomy from the depredations of the states, as 
embodied in legislation such as the Non-Intercourse Act. 
2. 	 The Goals of the Narragansett Following Federal 
Acknowledgment 
That the Settlement Act's legislative history contemplates a re­
newed trust obligation toward the Narragansett in the event of fed­
eral acknowledgment suggests that Congress foresaw a future in 
which the tribe would regain a full governmental identity-an iden­
tity that necessarily included sovereign immunity. It is reasonable 
to interpret the Settlement Act as providing for state jurisdiction 
over the corporation that stood in for the tribe in the five years 
between the Settlement Act and the tribe's federal acknowledg­
ment, but it makes little sense to conclude that such jurisdiction 
necessarily transferred onto a newly recognized governmental 
entity. 
Indian tribes want to return to an era when they related exclu­
sively with the federal government and were protected from state 
intrusions.233 For the Narragansett people, regaining a portion of 
their ancestral lands is part of a still-uncompleted arc that runs from 
nationhood, through conquest and disenfranchisement, and finally 
231. H.R. REP. No. 95-1453, at 8 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 
1951. 
232. Id. The Bureau of the Interior frequently takes Indian lands into trust in 
order to help maintain tribal land bases. See Land Acquisitions: Purpose and Scope, 25 
C.F.R. § 151.1 (2008). The federal government was responsible for stripping many 
tribes of both their land and political power; many thinkers believe that the federal 
government can facilitate tribes' political resurgence by holding tribal lands in trust. 
See, e.g., Padraic I. McCoy, The Land Must Hold the People: Native Modes of Territori­
ality and Contemporary Tribal Justifications for Placing Land into Trust Through 25 
C.P.R. Part 151, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421 (2003) (arguing that an American Indian 
return to political power can only occur from a land base secured from alienation). 
233. Vollmann, supra note 199, at 5. 
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returns to independence and self-determination.234 That the Narra­
gansett claim was about self-determination, not just land, is evi­
denced by the tribe's continued drive toward federal 
acknowledgment in the wake of the Settlement Act235 and its ongo­
ing efforts to use gaming and tobacco revenues to right historical 
wrongs and gain economic independence.236 Once federal acknowl­
edgment and the Settlement Act are understood as components of 
the larger Narragansett struggle to recover a measure of indepen­
dent existence, the en bane opinion's insistence that it "would defy 
common sense" to construe the Settlement Act as anything other 
than an abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity appears 
unfounded.237 
After examining the Narragansett's struggle in its historical 
context, it makes no sense to presume, as the en banc majority did, 
that the federal government would help resolve an Indian land 
claim by subjecting the tribe in question to state jurisdiction only to 
guarantee the same tribe governmental privileges and immunities 
five years later. Far more logical is the view offered by the en banc 
dissenters: the Settlement Act's jurisdictional provision prevented 
the imposition into Rhode Island of an enclave into which its laws 
could not reach, while encouraging the Narragansett's resurgence in 
a manner consistent with the federal trust responsibility.238 
This interpretation is also consonant with Congress's policy of 
maintaining tribal sovereign immunity as a means of encouraging 
American Indian economic development and political autonomy.239 
If states and private parties are forced to deal with tribes as govern­
ments, rather than as civil litigants or criminal defendants, the like­
lihood is greater that disputes will be resolved in a manner that 
respects tribal prerogatives. In the context of the Rhode Island­
Narragansett dispute, the impediments to direct enforcement 
234. Narragansett Chief Sachem Matthew Thomas gave eloquent voice to his 
people's history and aspirations in a 2004 Op-Ed piece in the Providence Journal. See 
Matthew Thomas, 'Still Fighting King Philip's War'-Narragansetts Have a Right to 
Their Dream, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 3,2004, at B4, available at 2004 WLNR 11512836. 
235. The federal government recognized the Narragansett in 1983. See Final De­
termination for Federal Acknowledgment of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Is­
land, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Bureau of Indian Affairs Feb. 10. 1983). 
236. Thomas, supra note 234. 
237. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(en banc). This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's reading of similar 
language in Bryan v. Itasca County, 423 U.S. 373 (1976). See supra notes 130-134 and 
accompanying text. 
238. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F. 3d. at 37-38 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
239. See supra notes 81-85. 
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erected by tribal immunity could have provided an incentive for the 
state to reach a negotiated agreement with the tribe instead of 
resorting to force.24o The First Circuit's validation of Rhode Is­
land's confrontational tactics, however, means that such agreements 
are unlikely to be the future of relations between tribe and state. 
C. 	 Basic Principles of Federal Indian Law: Without § 1708, 
Rhode Island Would Not Have Jurisdiction Over the 
Settlement Lands 
1. 	 The En Banc Court's Misinterpretation of Precedent 
Much of the en banc majority's analysis rests on the mistaken 
premise that, at the time of the Settlement Act, "the Supreme 
Court had already adopted the approach of permitting the exercise 
of state jurisdiction within Indian lands where the exercise of such 
jurisdiction had not been preempted by federallaw."241 This inter­
pretation relies on language in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission stating that, in judicial analysis of questions of state 
jurisdiction on Indian lands, "the trend has been away from the idea 
of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and to­
ward reliance on federal pre-emption. "242 The majority believed 
that the Settlement Act gave Rhode Island civil and criminal juris­
diction over the Narragansett lands without § 1708. In order to 
avoid construing the statutory language as mere surplusage, the 
court concluded that § 1708 must be intended to give Rhode Island 
legal power over something it otherwise would not have been able 
to control-namely, the Narragansett tribe itself. 
This reading of McClanahan misstates the preemption analysis 
appropriate in the context of Indian law, which differs significantly 
from the usual approach to federal displacement of state authority. 
Whereas most preemption inquiries begin with the presumption 
that Congress does not intend to displace state law in its traditional 
realms of power, such a presumption is inappropriate when constru­
ing statutes that deal with Indian lands where there exists no tradi­
tional role for state government.243 As the McClanahan Court 
240. There were attempts in the weeks and days leading up to the smoke shop 
raid to negotiate a resolution to the confli~t. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 5. 
241. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 26 (citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State 
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)). 
242. 	 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172. 
243. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 94 
(1987). Preemption analysis in the non-Indian law context begins with the premise that 
federal legislation only invades traditional spheres of state control upon a clear showing 
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described, the appropriate preemption analysis when considering 
state jurisdiction over Indian lands and tribal members focuses not 
on traditional spheres of state power but on the intended federal 
relationship to the tribal territory, as embodied in the relevant stat­
ute or treaty.244 This interpretive exercise must be informed by the 
United States' history of treating Indians as politically separate 
peoples and the federal trust obligation to protect tribes' remaining 
sovereignty.245 
McClanahan begins its discussion of preemption by noting that 
states have jurisdiction over people and property on Indian lands 
only when Congress has expressly so provided.246 The Court goes 
on to describe how historical circumstance has necessitated a move­
ment away from inherent tribal sovereignty as a bar to state juris­
diction and toward consideration of congressional intent.247 
Contrary to the en banc majority's reading, however, the opinion 
makes clear that a presumption against state jurisdiction on Indian 
lands remains the interpretive starting point.248 Although the In­
dian preemption analysis requires a court to balance the competing 
tribal, state, and federal interests implicated by an attempted asser­
tion of state jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
states rarely have a valid interest in controlling Indian activities on 
of congressional intent. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983). For a discussion of the issues and methods involved in traditional state/ 
federal preemption analysis, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 392-416. 
244. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172-74. As the en banc dissenters point out, nu­
merous statutes and treaties contemplate exclusively tribal and federal authority over 
American Indian lands, with no role at all for state law enforcement or jurisdiction. 
Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 37-38 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
245. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172; WILKINSON, supra note 243, at 94-95. 
246. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171-72. 
247. Id. at 172. 
248. The shift away from absolute notions of tribal sovereignty and toward reli­
ance on treaties and statutes parallels the change in Federal Indian policy marked by 
the transition from the treaty period to the era of plenary congressional power-the 
former characterized by deference to the inherently independent nature of Indian na­
tions, the latter by deference to Congress's power to unilaterally and exclusively control 
Indian affairs. Despite this shift in underlying doctrine, the preemption analysis an­
nounced in McClanahan was not intended to ease the presumption against state juris­
diction or to lessen the burden imposed on states attempting to defeat it. See Skibine, 
supra note 48, at 1151-52; see also L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sover­
eignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 824 (1996) (claiming that the pre­
sumption against state jurisdiction is the correct jumping-off point for preemption 
analysis "because Congress [has] acted consistently on the assumption that states lacked 
jurisdiction" when it legislates on Indian affairs). 
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Indian lands, especially in light of the enduring federal interest in 
protecting tribes from state power.249 
2. Interpreting § 1708 in Light of McClanahan 
Under the preemption analysis described above, the Settle­
ment Act without § 1708 would not have given Rhode Island civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over the Narragansett lands. Federal ac­
tion to help an Indian tribe recover land it lost to unlawful state 
action is consistent with a return to the exclusive government-to­
government relationship embodied in the Non-Intercourse Act, not 
with federal intent to put tribal lands under state control. Without 
any provision to the contrary, the Settlement Act would have sug­
gested congressional intent to return the tribe to the legal status it 
enjoyed prior to the unlawful alienation of its lands-answerable 
only to the federal government and beyond Rhode Island's jurisdic­
tional reach. 
A more reasonable interpretation of § 1708 is that it intended 
to ensure that the federal government did not leave itself open to 
general law enforcement obligations with regard to the settlement 
lands and their inhabitants.25o This interpretation is bolstered by 
the Settlement Act's legislative history, which makes clear that, 
upon the extinguishment of all Indian land claims in Rhode Island, 
the federal government intends to have no further responsibility for 
the settlement lands .251 Because the preemption analysis an­
nounced by the Court in McClanahan was only two years old when 
the tribe filed its claim and only five years old when Congress 
passed the Settlement Act, it makes sense that the legislation would 
249. See Louis G. Leonard, Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Environmental 
Justice in the Mescalero Apaches' Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 651, 677 (1997) (describing tribal self-government and economic development, 
as well as the health and welfare of tribal members, as joint federal and tribal interests 
that generally outweigh state regulatory interests). For Justice Thurgood Marshall, who 
wrote the McClanahan opinion, the presumption against state jurisdiction on Indian 
lands was an aspect of a broader vision of the federal government as a bulwark against 
state government abuses. See Rebecca Tsosie, Separate Sovereigns, Civil Rights and the 
Sacred Text: The Legacy of Justice Thurgood Marshal/'s Indian Law Jurisprudence, 26 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495,507 (1994). Although the Indian preemption inquiry necessitates a 
balancing of all relevant interests, Justice Marshall's preemption opinions suggest that a 
state interest sufficient to justify jurisdiction over Indians on Indian lands exists only in 
theory. Id. at 507. 
250. As the en banc dissenters point out, federal responsibility for law enforce­
ment is the norm on many western reservations. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode 
Island, 449 F.3d 16, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
251. H.R. REp. No. 95-1453, at 10-11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 
1954. 
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definitively address which government was responsible for law en­
forcement on the Narragansett lands. 
The en banc majority cites the presumption that Congress en­
acts laws with relevant Supreme Court precedent in mind.252 Be­
cause it believed that McClanahan conferred state jurisdiction over 
Indian lands in the absence of a statutory grant, the majority inter­
preted the relevant precedent to mean that § 1708's jurisdictional 
provision necessarily implicated sovereign immunity.253 With re­
gard to tribal sovereign immunity, however, the relevant precedent 
at the time of the Settlement Act was remarkably protective. As 
the en banc dissenters point out, in the two years preceding the 
passage of the Settlement Act-years in which the assertion of the 
eastern land claims was trumpeting the resurgent political presence 
of the eastern tribes-the Supreme Court decided two cases in 
which language nearly identical that in § 1708's was held to have no 
effect on sovereign immunity.254 
3. 	 The Meaning of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez for the 
Settlement Act Negotiations 
Another relevant precedent was decided between the time 
Rhode Island and the Narragansett concluded their negotiations 
and the time that Congress memorialized their agreement in the 
Settlement Act: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez .255 Congress was 
surely aware of the Martinez Court's unwillingness to conflate con­
gressional creation of substantive rights and obligations in Indian 
legislation with enforcement mechanisms that infringed on tribal 
immunity.256 Since Martinez was handed down as Congress consid­
252. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 26. 
253. Id. (citing McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 
(1973». 
254. Id. at 34-35 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 
433 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1977); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 (1976»; see also 
supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's applica­
tion of the Indian canon in Itasca County). In Puyallup Tribe, the Court held that 
sovereign immunity prevented the application of state fisheries regulation to an Indian 
tribe, even in the presence of a treaty permitting state regulation of fishing by individual 
tribal members. Puyal/up Tribe, 433 U.S. at 168-69. 
255. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The Martinez decision 
was handed down on May 15, 1978. Rhode Island and the Narragansett concluded their 
negotiations on February 28, 1978. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 153, 161 (D.R.I. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 407 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 2005), 
affd en bane, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006). The Settlement Act passed into law on Sep­
tember 30,1978. 25 U.S.c. § 1701 (2000). 
256. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62-63. 
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ered the Settlement Act, it is reasonable to assume that the 
lawmakers were conscious of the specific language the Court re­
quired to find a restriction on the immunity of tribal governments 
in federal legislation.257 That Congress was aware of the Court's 
interpretive stance with regard to tribal immunity is even more 
likely in light of its explicit endorsement of the immunity doctrine 
three years prior to the passage of the Settlement Act258 and the 
overall shift in federal policy towards Indian self-determination and 
political autonomy.259 
4. 	 Recent Precedent Illustrates the Continuing Vitality of 
the Immunity Doctrine 
The en banc opinion's finding of abrogation is also in conflict 
with recent Supreme Court precedent.260 The majority attempts to 
distinguish Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. ,261 
while simply ignoring the most relevant precedent, Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe.262 The ma­
jority explained that Kiowa Tribe, which forcefully drew a distinc­
tion between the applicability of state law and the availability of 
state law enforcement means, was inapposite because it dealt with 
the attempt to enforce a valid tribal obligation of a private party, 
not a state.263 
Had the majority dug deeper, however, it would have discov­
ered that Kiowa Tribe was simply restating the holding of 
Oklahoma Tax Commission: the existence of a tribe's substantive 
obligation to assist a state in the collection of cigarette taxes is in­
sufficient to overcome tribal immunity and permit the use of state 
civil process to compel tribal compliance.264 The en banc opinion 
focused on the fact that none of the precedential cases dealt with "a 
state's power to enforce its admittedly applicable criminal laws 
257. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text. 
258. See 25 U.S.c. § 450(n) (2000). 
259. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text. 
260. Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16,28-29 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(en banc). 
261. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
262. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 
(1991). 
263. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 29. Kiowa Tribe dealt with a private 
party's attempt to enforce a contract against an Indian tribe. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 
753. 
264. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 755; Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. 
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against a noncompliant Indian tribe. "265 This emphasis on the crim­
inal nature of the law at issue, however, elevates form over sub­
stance. What Oklahoma Tax Commission did establish is that 
states are barred by tribal sovereign immunity from using their legal 
processes to compel tribal compliance with state law, even in the 
presence of substantive tribal obligation.266 The majority failed to 
effectively distinguish, or even meaningfully discuss, Oklahoma Tax 
Commission.267 To hold that the situation changes because the 
state law at issue is criminal rather than civil would subject the pre­
rogatives of a tribal government to the vagaries of state law-ex­
actly what the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity intends to 
prevent. 
D. 	 Applying the Indian Canon to § 1708's Ambiguous 
Jurisdictional Grant 
To the en banc majority, § 1708 unambiguously abrogated the 
Narragansett's sovereign immunity.268 The court believed that the 
particular circumstances surrounding the Narragansett land claim 
and the Settlement Act, as well as the jurisdictional principles enu­
merated in McCLanahan,269 left no doubt that Congress intended to 
subject the tribe itself to Rhode Island law. Since it admitted to no 
statutory ambiguity, the majority rejected the dissenters' attempt to 
apply the Indian canon.270 
This rejection was a mistake. The Settlement Act is markedly 
ambiguous with regard to the Narragansett's sovereign immu­
265. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 29 (emphasis added). As the dissent­
ers point out, tribes have successfully used sovereign immunity as a defense against 
states' attempts to subject them to criminal process. Id. at 33 (Lipez, J., dissenting) 
(citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1977). 
266. 	 Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514. 
267. The en banc majority's sole mention of Oklahoma Tax Commission was as a 
citation in support of the principle that "tribal sovereign immunity is most accurately 
considered an incidence or subset of tribal sovereignty." Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 
F.3d at 24-25. Because the majority believed that the Settlement Act left the Narragan­
sett without any meaningful sovereignty, it apparently believed that Oklahoma Tax 
Commission was irrelevant. 
268. Id. at 28-29. 
269. See supra notes 241-249 and accompanying text. 
270. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 449 F.3d at 29 ("[B]ecause there is no ambiguity 
in the meaning and purport of section 1708(a), this case does not implicate the hoary 
canon of construction relied on by the dissent."). The en banc majority's denigration of 
the Indian canon appears to directly contradict the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of its 
principles in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200 
(1999). 
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nity.271 The majority's insistence that jurisdiction over the tribe it­
self was the most valuable consideration that Rhode Island received 
in the Settlement Act is belied by the statute's plain language and 
legislative history. Both of these repeatedly emphasize clouded ti­
tles and the need to extinguish land claims in Rhode Island but are 
silent on the legal status of the Narragansett tribe.272 The Settle­
ment Act does not indicate what effect federal acknowledgment 
would have on the tribe's status vis-a-vis the state, but its legislative 
history suggests that Congress contemplated a return to a trust rela­
tionship with the Narragansett, an eventuality completely at odds 
with a grant of state jurisdiction over the tribe. 
In addition, the majority's mistaken application of McClana­
han presumes a default to state jurisdiction over tribal lands by mis­
construing which preemption analysis is appropriate in the Indian 
law context. Under the "intended federal relationship" analysis 
enunciated in McClanahan, § 1708's grant is more likely meant to 
ensure that Rhode Island, and not the federal government, was re­
sponsible for law enforcement on the Narragansett lands. And, fi­
nally, the majority disregards relevant Supreme Court precedent, 
conflating Rhode Island's right to demand tribal compliance with 
state law with Rhode Island's ability to enforce it. 
The Indian canon requires that statutes passed for the benefit 
of American Indians be interpreted liberally, with ambiguous provi­
sions construed in favor of tribal interests?73 There can be little 
doubt that the Settlement Act was passed for the benefit of the 
Narragansett-it returned to them a portion of their ancestral 
lands, and was part of their journey from the depths of detribaliza­
tion to restored national identity and federal acknowledgment. 
Furthermore, the Settlement Act was passed as Congress, mindful 
of the unhappy effects of failed Indian policies, charted a new 
course that emphasized self-determination, not state control. Con­
gress has repeatedly expressed support for the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity and the role it plays in protecting and nurturing 
tribal governments as they develop. It is inconsistent with these 
271. See supra notes 197-220 and accompanying text. 
272. Under the Indian canon, the proper inference from statutory silence is that 
sovereign powers remain intact. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 198; Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 n.14 (1982). 
273. This interpretive approach is mandated by the trust obligation, which re­
quires the federal government to act in good faith toward Indian tribes. See Mille Lacs, 
526 U.S. at 200; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 417 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); see 
also supra notes 116-142 and accompanying text. 
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goals and principles to interpret a statute passed in such a context 
as subjecting the Narragansett to state control. 
Given the "plausible ambiguity"274 presented by the language 
and history surrounding the Settlement Act, the First Circuit should 
have applied the Indian canon in Narragansett Indian Tribe v. 
Rhode IsLand. The Settlement Act's silence with regard to sover­
eign immunity suggests that this important aspect of tribal existence 
and governance was entirely beyond the scope of the negotiated 
agreement it memorialized.275 It is inconceivable that the tribe 
would prospectively relinquish without mention rights and privi­
leges to which it plainly still aspired. 
Interpreting § 1708's jurisdictional grant as the Narragansett 
would have understood it-the approach prescribed by the Indian 
canon and the Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians-inevitably leads to the conclusion that the tribe 
intended to preserve its immunity in the event of federal recogni­
tion.276 As the Mille Lacs Court pointed out, the United States is a 
sophisticated party, perfectly capable of explicitly abrogating tribal 
rights and immunities when it so desires.277 The fact that Congress 
knew how to abrogate the Narragansett's sovereign immunity and 
instead codified a generally phrased jurisdictional grant demon­
strates a lack of intent to abrogate such an essential governmental 
attribute. 
274. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200. 
275. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000). 
276. The Mille Lacs Court was referring to the construction of a negotiated 
treaty. The Settlement Act, though literally a unilateral act of Congress, bears many of 
the indicia of an Indian treaty, as it is fundamentally a codification of an agreement 
negotiated by Rhode Island and the Narragansett. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1453, at 5 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 1949 ("The purpose of [the Settlement 
Act] is to implement a settlement agreement between the Narragansett Indian Tribe 
and the State of Rhode Island."); Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 
16,22 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) ("Congress confirmed [Rhode Island and the Narragan­
sett's] negotiated arrangement in the Settlement Act."). 
277. For example, the jurisdictional section of the Maine Indian Claims Settle­
ment Act, a close contemporary of the Settlement Act-it was passed in 1980-pro­
vides that "all Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians in the State of 
Maine ... shall be subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, the laws of 
the State, and the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State, to the same 
extent as any other person or land therein." 25 U.S.c. § 1725(a). Section 1725's ex­
plicit reference to state jurisdiction over Indian nations, tribes, or bands throws into 
stark contrast the Settlement Act's far more general provision, which mentions jurisdic­
tion over nothing other than lands. See id. § 1708(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the overarching themes of the Supreme Court's tribal 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is the refusal to conflate substan­
tive tribal obligations with implied rights of action against tribal 
governments. The Court has enforced this distinction between obli­
gation and remedy regardless whether the claimant is a private 
party or a state government.278 The reason for this uniformity is 
simple-in cases implicating tribal sovereign immunity, neither the 
identity nor the frequently valid interest of the claimant are suffi­
cient to defeat a tribe's governmental privilege to resist state legal 
process. The interests the Court has sacrificed before the altar of 
tribal immunity are frequently momentous, ranging from basic civil 
rights279 to admittedly valid multi-million dollar debts.280 The 
Court's willingness to compromise such interests is a testament to 
the centrality of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the federal pol­
icy of promoting American Indian self-government and economic 
self-sufficiency. 
The harsh outcomes of these tribal immunity rulings are fre­
quently mitigated by the availability of remedial alternatives to di­
rect legal action against a tribal government. As the Court noted in 
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe, numerous means exist by which an aggrieved state may gain 
tribal compliance with substantive obligations while remaining re­
spectful of a tribe's governmental status.281 Although these en­
forcement mechanisms are less efficient and more complicated than 
direct legal action, they are a necessary condition imposed by the 
unique legal status of federally acknowledged Indian tribes. 
Narragansett Indian Tribe contradicts both Congress's over­
arching policy statements and the guiding principles of the Supreme 
Court's tribal sovereign immunity jurisprudence. It conflates the 
tribe's substantive obligations with a state right of direct enforce­
ment, ignoring the frequency with which the Supreme Court has 
held that such obligations do not amount to an abrogation of sover­
eign immunity. Furthermore, it presupposes a deferral to state au­
thority on tribal lands when longstanding doctrine imposes a heavy 
278. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 
U.S. 505 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
279. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49. 
280. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. 505. 
281. Id. at 514. 
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burden against such authority. Lastly, it misstates the relevant state 
and tribal interests in a manner that distorts congressional intent. 
The source of this inconsistency may lie in the more general 
jurisprudential trend known as the "new federalism," which has 
tended to elevate state interests over those of both federal and tri­
bal governments.282 The Supreme Court appeared to split the dif­
ference between elevation of state interests and continued deferral 
to Congress on issues of tribal immunity when it held, in Oklahoma 
Tax Commission, that tribes have a substantive obligation to assist 
in the collection of state cigarette taxes but that states are without 
power to directly enforce these obligations should tribes fail to ful­
fill them voluntarily.283 Oklahoma Tax Commission suggested re­
medial strategies that allow for the enforcement of state tax law 
while respecting the important federal and tribal interests furthered 
by sovereign immunity.284 
While it never directly addressed the implications of Oklahoma 
Tax Commission for its holding in Narragansett Indian Tribe, the 
First Circuit appeared to conclude that the jurisdictional grant con­
tained in § 1708 of the Settlement Act was sufficient to distinguish 
the two cases. Such a conclusion is inconsistent with the interpret­
ive principles and basic presumptions of Federal Indian law. Per­
haps the en banc majority was anticipating a shift in Supreme Court 
precedent away from the deference traditionally shown to congres­
sional approval of the immunity doctrine-a shift that, as of this 
writing, has yet to come. Because of this aberrant decision, the 
282. The general contours of the new federalism are well documented, and are far 
beyond the scope of this Note. With regard to the effect of this trend on tribal interests, 
see Matthew Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 
121 (2006) (arguing that the uncertain nature and extent of federal power over Indians 
has allowed the Court to reshape the allocation of power in the stateltribal relationship 
according to its own preferences); Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the Rehn­
quist Court's Indian jurisprudence and arguing that the "new federalism" has resulted 
in a constricted vision of tribal sovereignty); see also Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past 
and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993) (discussing the conflicting visions of federal power repre­
sented by colonialist and constitutionalist philosophies in the context of Indian law); 
Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tri­
bal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001) (arguing that without robust federal 
protection for tribal sovereignty, American Indians will cease to exist as politically and 
culturally distinct peoples). 
283. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 513-14. 
284. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
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Narragansett once again find themselves subject to the power of a 
state whose domination they had long sought to escape. 
Merritt Schnipper 
